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THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANTICANON
Deborah Pearlstein*
Donald Trump’s presidency has given rise to a raft of concerns not just
about the wisdom of particular policy decisions but also about the prospect
that executive actions might have troubling longer term “precedential”
effects. While critics tend to leave undefined what “precedent” in this
context means, existing constitutional structures provide multiple
mechanisms by which presidential practice can influence future executive
branch conduct: judicial actors rely on practice as gloss on constitutional
meaning, executive branch officials rely on past practice in guiding
institutional norms of behavior, and elected officials outside the executive
branch and the people themselves draw on past practice to help evaluate the
political legitimacy of presidential conduct in the present day. Yet while the
prospect of precedential impact exists, it is equally apparent that not every
executive action ends up having any of these effects. Quite to the contrary,
from the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration’s action targeting JapaneseAmericans on the basis of race during World War II, to President Richard
Nixon’s behavior in the Saturday Night Massacre, one might equally
hypothesize the existence of an executive branch anticanon of sorts—
executive actions that have produced none of the standard precedential
effects, save inasmuch as they have served to establish an interpretive or
normative understanding rejecting such executive behavior. Identifying how
certain instances of presidential practice achieve such anticanonical status
seems today an especially pressing exercise. In addition to helping refine
our thinking about the interpretive impact of presidential practice on
constitutional meaning, establishing how anticanonical status is achieved
may help clarify the agreed-upon scope of at least some of the norms of
democratic governance that have proven rich fodder in recent years for
“constitutional hardball”—that is, resort to practices that are technically
constitutional but that one might once have thought run afoul of normative
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principles of governance that could go without saying. Surfacing the
existence of anticanonical practice can likewise help guard against the
prospect that disfavored presidential behaviors might reset default normative
expectations among government officials and the public, expectations that
tend to assume because past presidents have taken some action, future
presidents can defensibly take the same approach.
And tracing
anticanonical development can help to identify pathways for forestalling
emergent presidential precedent from developing.
By examining
anticanonical development through several concrete examples, this Article
aims to demonstrate how presidential “precedent” is established less by
presidential action and more by systemic reaction to what presidents do.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the many intensely partisan conflicts surrounding the Donald Trump
presidency, the president’s decision in early 2019 to invoke authority under
the National Emergencies Act1 to secure funding for a border wall that
Congress had otherwise declined to support provoked sharp, strikingly
bipartisan reactions. Some members of Congress criticized the policy
wisdom of the wall; others urged that the president’s action was a usurpation

1. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
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of Congress’s constitutional authority.2 But at least as common a concern
was that the president’s action would set a negative precedent. As one
senator put it: “If President Trump opens the door to presidents declaring
fake emergencies to fund spending they can’t persuade the people’s
representatives in Congress to support, then a dangerous precedent has been
set . . . .”3 The border wall is hardly the only occasion on which government
officials have worried about the long-term effects of the current presidency.
Indeed, concerns about the creation of presidential “precedent” have
accompanied any number of presidential controversies, from the president’s
unilateral decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria,4 to his decision to
pardon Arizona Sheriff Joseph Arpaio,5 and the decision to fire the director
of the FBI while an investigation into his presidential campaign was
pending.6
Describing presidential action as precedent setting should sound at least
somewhat strange to lawyerly ears. What presidents do is hardly precedential
in any traditional, stare decisis sense; neither courts nor Congress nor
subsequent presidents are by any formal command bound to follow the
examples of past presidents in making their own policy decisions. Yet, the
expression is far from wholly rhetorical. What presidents do—what past
presidents have done—can matter a great deal not only in creating legal
meaning but also in guiding executive branch decision-making day-to-day.
In purely doctrinal terms, the U.S. Supreme Court has long taken the view
that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated
as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President” by Article II of the
U.S. Constitution.7 Opinions of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of
2. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional
Clash,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/
15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html [https://perma.cc/CL4P-7QCQ].
3. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Patty Murray, Senator Murray Denounces Trump’s Plan to
Bypass Congress and Declare Phony National Emergency, Votes to Keep Government Open
and Reject President Trump’s Wasteful Wall (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.murray.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/mobile/newsreleases?ID=47EF48DE-86A0-43AD-8CBE43C1965A0B76 [https://perma.cc/8URP-6QBX]; see also Tim Haines, GOP Sen. Lisa
Murkowski: “Dangerous Precedent” to Allow President to Use National Emergency to
Override Will of Congress, REALCLEARPOLITICS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.
realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/03/07/gop_sen_lisa_murkowski_dangerous_precedent_to_
allow_president_to_use_national_emergency_to_override_will_of_congress.html [https://
perma.cc/3QTV-ND6P].
4. See, e.g., Catie Edmondson, In Bipartisan Rebuke, House Majority Condemns Trump
for Syria Withdrawal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/16/us/politics/house-vote-trump-syria.html [https://perma.cc/J9M3-K2QW].
5. T. J. Raphael, Trump’s Arpaio Pardon Draws Bipartisan Criticism, THE WORLD
(Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-08-28/trumps-arpaio-pardon-drawsbipartisan-criticism [https://perma.cc/5EDW-ZL4T].
6. See, e.g., Comey Firing: Reaction from Members of Congress on FBI Director’s
Dismissal, WASH. POST (May 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
wp/2017/05/09/comey-firing-reaction-from-members-of-congress-on-fbi-directors-dismissal
[https://perma.cc/4SH8-QCFK].
7. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)). State practice is at least
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Legal Counsel (OLC) invoke particularly expansive versions of this idea
(with or without evidence that the practice has been broken or repeated) in
evaluating the legality of contemplated executive action in a range of
contexts.8 Apart from its role in establishing constitutional meaning, practice
can also function to establish and maintain norms that guide official decisionmaking inside the executive branch.9 And it can help establish norms that
extend beyond the executive branch, setting expectations against which
Congress and the public evaluate the legitimacy of presidential conduct more
broadly.10 Taken together, these varied potential impacts of presidential
practice can produce a profound effect on present governance.
Yet those who are most concerned about the impact of the current
presidency might take some comfort that not all presidential behavior
becomes influential in practice-perpetuating ways. Indeed, some historical
instances of executive conduct are, today, broadly recognized as mistaken,
unlawful, or simply wrong. Think of the internment of Japanese-American
citizens during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration or the Saturday Night
Massacre during Richard Nixon’s. Legal scholars have documented an
anticanon among decisions of the Supreme Court. At base, the judicial
anticanon is a set of precedents that, whether or not ever formally overturned,
are widely recognized among law professors, lawyers, and jurists to no longer
be good law.11 One might equally hypothesize something of an anticanon of
executive behavior—that is, historical executive branch conduct that has
come to be widely recognized as so unacceptable in character that it has not
produced any of the “precedential” effects just described. The anticanon of
executive behavior is executive practice that is not relied on by judicial actors
as evidence of constitutional meaning; and to the extent the behavior has
served to establish or maintain norms within or outside the executive branch,
it does so only insofar as the behavior has come to serve as “positive authority
for the propositions that [it] reject[s].”12
Determining how certain executive branch actions achieve anticanonical
status seems to be of practical utility in the current climate in several respects.
First, to the extent judicial attention to presidential practice is based on the
theory that constitutional meaning may be discerned from mutually agreed

equally central to the development of customary international law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (AM. L. INST. 1987) (“Customary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation.”).
8. See, e.g., Auth. to Use Mil. Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7, 14 (2011).
9. See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2189–
90 (2018).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011)
(identifying Dred Scott v. Sanford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York, and Korematsu
v. United States as constituent members of the judicial anticanon).
12. Id. at 384.
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upon institutional performance over time,13 evidence that the executive
branch has itself spurned a particular practice seems at least as significant
evidence of nonagreement as a formal congressional objection to an assertion
of power or, for that matter, congressional silence. Moreover, surfacing the
existence of anticanonical practices may provide a methodology for
describing with more granularity current norms of democratic governance,
including those that have proven rich fodder for what Mark Tushnet usefully
described as “constitutional hardball”: “claims and practices . . . that are
without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine
and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with . . . the ‘go without
saying’ assumptions that underpin working systems of constitutional
government.”14 From across-the-board invocations of executive privilege
and claims of an ability to avoid all investigation,15 to reallocation of
congressionally appropriated funds16—recent practice suggests that at least
some of what one might have considered “go without saying” assumptions
may actually need to be said. Finally, establishing how anticanonical status
is achieved may help challenge an otherwise default assumption that every
instance of executive behavior has inevitable precedential effects. Indeed, if
presidential “precedent” is not born but made, past routes to anticanonical
status might serve as a road map for how current institutions can act to guard
against the prospect that disfavored presidential actions develop such
precedential effects.
However useful this exercise may be, the challenges of identifying an
executive branch anticanon are quite different from the exercise in the
judicial realm. The concept of a judicial “canon” is reasonably well
understood, having been the subject of writings in theory and practice for
some time.17 If a judicial canon might be defined as a set of Supreme Court
cases that a particular constituency—say, law professors—agrees is essential
to accomplishing a particular goal—say, the attainment of professional legal
competence—then it is easy enough to determine which cases likely belong
in such a canon. Very roughly, one might draw a line through those cases
that most commonly appear in casebooks and scholarly commentary
assembled for that same purpose.18 If a judicial anticanon is, in one respect,
made up of cases that are no longer recognized as good law, teachable only
13. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 426 (2012) (citing EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1987) (1790)).
14. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 & n.2
(2004).
15. See, e.g., Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2019), vacated, 140
S. Ct. 2019 (2020); Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Couns. to the President, to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Elijah C. Cummings, Chairman of the House Comm.
on Oversight and Reform, Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Foreign Affs. Comm. & Adam B.
Schiff, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intel. (Oct. 8, 2019) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Cipollone Letter].
16. See, e.g., El Paso County v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
17. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963, 970 (1998).
18. See Greene, supra note 11, at 474.
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insofar as they serve as examples of bad or rejected decisions, then one can
look to scholarly work and especially subsequent judicial decisions as key
evidence relevant to determining whether the cases are cited unfavorably or
at all.19
In contrast, it is far from apparent that a “canon” of executive practice
exists for any purpose. Executive practice may take any number of forms,
from formal executive orders, to informal policy decisions or unwritten
habits. Some practices address problems prone to recurrence, others address
unique or at least deeply historically contingent events.20 It is hardly a
limited set. Likewise, given the range of ways in which executive action
might manifest precedential effect, the constituencies that have some say in
establishing the precedential effect (or not) of any of these executive
behaviors include not only courts but also executive branch officials and
those who influence their views, members of Congress, and the public
alike—all of whom have multiple formal and informal methods to express
their views about a particular practice but generally no compulsion to do so.
Of greater concern, while the current Justices have professional, ethical
obligations to consider what past Justices have held—making judicial
opinions essential evidence in establishing a past decision’s present
significance—presidents have no such duty. Indeed, particularly when it
comes to executive practices that are generally held in high regard, it may
well be a feature of such conduct that it most often produces little in the way
of conscious, collective acknowledgement, or even agreed-upon definition.
Yet the same features that make an executive branch canon so difficult to
identify help make the case that an anticanon is more susceptible to
discovery. Unlike positive or uncontroversial executive practices, disfavored
executive actions tend to produce substantial, and often quite detailed,
records—in reactions by the courts, Congress, official and popular opinion,
and more.21 Because presidential precedent can have effects on a variety of
institutional and private actors, one can observe the response to a particular
practice among a range of constituencies to note evidence of express
condemnation, which may exist in actions by Congress, the courts, or
elsewhere. It is equally possible, and at times just as instructive, to observe
the failure of those constituencies to rely on the practical example in
circumstances in which the practice might otherwise seem to bolster their
case. Where all relevant constituencies, particularly when represented in
bipartisan fashion, agree in either condemnation or nonreliance, one might
be more confident in assessing the practice to be “anticanonical” in nature.
And because so many constituencies are involved in determining whether a
presidential practice has any precedential effect, the exercise requires
observing the actions and reactions of multiple institutional actors that, by
the nature of constitutional governance, emerge only over time. Because
norms themselves develop and change, a practice that sees sustained
19. See id.
20. See infra Part I (discussing presidential precedent).
21. See infra Part II.B (noting various reactions to the Iran-Contra affair).
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rejection may be recognized as more persuasively deserving of anticanonical
status than one that happened to garner a single adverse (or welcoming)
response at the time the president acted.
The first challenge, then, is epistemological in nature: how do we
determine which instances of executive behavior the relevant constituencies
agree are anticanonical? To answer that question, this Article begins by
canvassing the general mechanisms by which executive practice may come
to have precedential effect and then proposes a tentative set of answers for
which constituencies and by what indicia of recognition a particular practice
might become anticanonical in nature. Part II then tests this approach against
several historical candidates for anticanonical status, both to illustrate how
one might assess the views of various institutional actors over time and to
refine the initial criteria for evaluating anticanonical status. In Part III, this
Article examines how the analysis of these examples should inform our
understanding of current questions of constitutional and normative
interpretation. Beyond the prospect that such lists of executive actions in
plain view may better guide courts and executive branch actors in
understanding the nature of executive power in areas of ongoing conflict, the
more significant impact of such findings may be in helping contemporary
institutions understand the effect of their own responses to presidential
behavior. While the Madisonian branches may have become accustomed to
passively accepting the precedential reality of federal judicial decisions, this
Article’s anticanonical exercise makes clear that the precedential status of
presidential behavior depends far more on what happens after the president
acts.
A final note before beginning. Because judicial canons and anticanons are,
at least in scholarly and pedagogical settings, recognized phenomena, it has
been possible and useful to subject them as identified sets to various metaanalyses—i.e., what do cases in this canon (or anticanon) have in common?
Why are they so broadly recognized as essential reading (for good or ill)?
What underlying sociological or other forces have led to their construction in
present form? The notion of an executive branch anticanon as hypothesized
here is, comparatively speaking, a conceptual newborn. As a result, the
questions this Article aims to answer are designed to define, describe and, to
an extent, justify mapping an executive branch anticanon’s existence. It aims
to understand whether and how—even in an era of stark partisan division—
an executive branch anticanon might be established and sustained. It offers
only preliminary speculation about why.
I. PRESIDENTIAL PRECEDENT AND THE PROSPECT OF CANON
Past presidential actions—by which I mean official decisions taken by
written order or otherwise with a direct effect on the conduct of the U.S.
government—matter in present governance in more ways than one. In the
law, the Supreme Court has relied on accounts of executive practice to inform
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its understanding of constitutional meaning in any number of contexts.22
Much as the practice of nation-state actors informs the content of customary
international law over time,23 the Court has recognized that past executive
practice may lend a customary constitutional gloss on the scope of U.S.
executive power today.24 At the same time, as a growing number of scholars
have documented, past practice can be central in the creation of sublegal
norms of internal executive branch behavior—from preserving prosecutorial
independence, to naming new cabinet appointees.25 And past practice can
help shape expectations for Congress and the public beyond the executive
branch, either in ways that legitimate and reassure (as when presidents cite
their predecessors’ similar examples to build political support for a
controversial initiative) or signal cause for alarm (as when critics assail
executive conduct for actions that are not normal presidential behavior).26
After sketching these mechanisms through which past practice can influence
present behavior, this part considers how concepts of canon and anticanon
might help make sense of which presidential conduct matters.
A. Presidential Precedent
Perhaps the most well-known, if not uncontroversial, use of past executive
practice is by courts and other official arbiters of legality who look to
historical practice as evidence of doctrinal meaning. This section thus begins
there before turning to more norm-focused effects.
1. Law Creation and Interpretation
The Supreme Court has long relied on executive branch practice to help
illuminate the meaning of the largely spare provisions of the Constitution’s
Article II.27 The leading discussion there remains Justice Felix Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer28 (Steel Seizure).29
Grappling with the question of whether President Harry S. Truman had the
constitutional authority to seize and operate the nation’s privately owned
steel mills on the eve of a labor strike—a putative strike Truman maintained
would threaten the availability of essential weapons and materiel for troops
already on the front lines in Korea—Justice Frankfurter rejected the
formalistic notion that the president’s Article II power could be confined to
inferences from the constitutional text. As he put it: “It is an inadmissibly
narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (AM. L.
INST. 1987).
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down,
65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1433–34 (2018); Renan, supra note 9, at 2207–15, 2244–47.
26. See infra Part I.C.
27. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 417–24 (canvassing examples of
cases relying on executive practice).
28. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
29. Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon
them.”30 Rather, Justice Frankfurter maintained that “a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned, . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive
Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”31 As the historical “record
is barren of instances comparable to the one before us,”32 Justice Frankfurter
concluded, there was no basis for sustaining Truman’s action.
The Steel Seizure case was hardly the first to note the relevance of
historical practice to constitutional interpretation. Quite to the contrary, the
historical practices of the political branches featured prominently among the
methodologies Chief Justice John Marshall embraced in McCulloch v.
Maryland.33 In Chief Justice Marshall’s conception, the actual practice of
government “ought to receive a considerable impression,” at least when
answering “a doubtful question” involving not the “great principles of
liberty” but rather “the respective powers of those who are equally the
representatives of the people.”34 Indeed, by the time Justice Frankfurter
wrote in 1952, the Court had repeatedly relied on practice-based reasoning
to inform its understanding of executive power on issues ranging from the
president’s power to subject legislation passed by Congress to the so-called
pocket veto,35 to the scope of the pardon power,36 to the disposition of public
lands.37
But it is Justice Frankfurter’s “practice-plus-acquiescence” formula—
underscoring the interpretive significance not just of a government practice
30. Id.
31. Id. at 610–11; see also id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government.”).
32. Id. at 612 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
34. Id. at 401; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (“As James
Madison wrote, it ‘was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and
differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & phrases necessarily
used in such a charter . . . and that it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate &
settle the meaning of some of them.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Letter to Spencer Roane
(Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 (G. Hunt ed., 1908))).
35. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 688–89 (1929) (“The views which we have
expressed as to the construction and effect of the constitutional provision . . . are confirmed
by the practical construction that has been given to it by the Presidents through a long course
of years, in which Congress has acquiesced. Long settled and established practice is a
consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this
character.”).
36. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925) (holding that the president’s
pardon power extended to a contempt of court conviction and noting that “long practice under
the pardoning power and acquiescence in it strongly sustains the construction it is based on”).
37. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472–73 (1915) (“[G]overnment
is a practical affair, intended for practical men . . . . [O]fficers, lawmakers, and citizens
naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department—on
the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated
as to crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the
basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence
of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself . . . .”).
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as such but of interbranch concordance about a practice—that has survived
most prominently in modern court decisions, including those recognizing, for
example, that Article II supports the president’s power to resolve claims
under settlement agreements with foreign countries without congressional
engagement38 and that the president’s exclusive power to recognize foreign
governments foreclosed congressional regulation of passport designations.39
It is certainly true that the Court and scholars have, over the years, offered
various reasons why concordance matters—sometimes treating interbranch
agreement as essential to sustain a departmental judgment of
constitutionality, or at least functional practicality; on other occasions
treating congressional inaction as signaling a waiver of institutional
prerogative; or as giving rise to institutional and public reliance interests
deserving of the Court’s respect.40 But the existence or absence of a shared
understanding of effective power has remained the relevant touchstone, even
when the results of such an inquiry have been, as on more than one occasion,
to defeat the president’s assertion of power.41
Such reliance on practice-plus-acquiescence to establish legal meaning is
equally apparent in the opinions of OLC, perhaps most in OLC opinions
regarding the president’s power to use force abroad. As OLC explained, for
instance, in its 2011 opinion citing examples of past conduct supporting the
president’s power to launch operations in Libya, absent new congressional
authorization, “historical practice is an important indication of constitutional
meaning, because it reflects the two political branches’ practical
understanding, developed since the founding of the Republic, of their
respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national defense.”42 With
respect to the “limited” presidential use of force abroad, the “pattern of
executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many decades
and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences the existence of

38. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (recognizing the president’s
Article II power to enter into an executive agreement suspending certain claims held by
American companies against the government of Iran as part of a settlement resolving the 1979
hostage crisis); id. (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued
practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action]
had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .’” (quoting Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. at
474)).
39. See generally Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (relying
on practice and acquiescence to establish the president’s exclusive power to decide whether
to recognize the territory of a foreign country on a U.S. passport).
40. For a discussion of the varied theories supporting interpretive use of practice-plusacquiescence, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 433.
41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014) (holding the
president’s challenged recess appointments invalid); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532
(2008) (“The President’s Memorandum [ordering state courts to give effect to a federal treaty
obligation] is not supported by a ‘particularly longstanding practice’ of congressional
acquiescence, but rather is what the United States itself has described as ‘unprecedented
action.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 29–30, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 & 0410566))).
42. See Auth. to Use Mil. Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7 (2011).
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broad constitutional power.’”43 While scholars continue to debate whether
OLC’s engagement on this topic has functioned as relatively more
constraining or enabling of executive action,44 there is no dispute that both
Republican- and Democratic-produced OLC opinions have relied heavily on
past practice as evidence of constitutional meaning.
Because OLC’s view is often the most authoritative available legal
guidance on presidential power in a variety of contexts, it is worth noting that
OLC’s reliance on practice has, in many contexts, gone beyond the habitual
practice-and-acquiescence formula, drawing at times on executive practice
without reference to congressional acquiescence or, indeed, even in the face
of congressional nonacquiescence. OLC has thus repeatedly advanced
constitutional objections to, for example, attempts by Congress to shape
diplomatic negotiations or to obtain certain executive branch documents or
testimony.45 Whether such claims ultimately prove persuasive in court is
another matter;46 as the D.C. federal district court recently held in rejecting
the Trump administration’s claim that administration officials enjoyed
absolute immunity from congressional subpoenas for testimony, “longevity”
of this view in OLC opinions “alone does not transform an unsupported
notion into law.”47 At a minimum, OLC’s habit underscores the prospect
that even isolated instances of conduct can have some significant effect on
future use.

43. Id. (quoting Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 178
(1994)) (referencing historical examples of presidential uses of force absent congressional
authorization in Panama, Bosnia, Haiti, and Yugoslavia).
44. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1132–35 (2013) (engaging the
debate about OLC’s role).
45. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 457–58, 458 n.200 (“[T]his Office
has ‘repeatedly objected on constitutional grounds to Congressional attempts to mandate the
time, manner and content of diplomatic negotiations,’ including in the context of potential
engagement with international fora.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 Op.
O.L.C. 1, 8 (2009))); id. at 8–9 (discussing similar executive branch precedents from the
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton administrations); see also
Assertion of Exec. Privilege over Documents Generated in Response to Cong. Investigation
into Operation Fast and Furious, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2–5 (2012) (analyzing the applicability of
executive privilege to certain Justice Department documents sought by the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform as part of its investigation into a law enforcement
operation known as “Fast and Furious”).
46. But see Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532 (observing that “the Government has not identified
a single instance in which the President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a
Presidential directive issued to state courts” requiring them to give effect to the judgment of
the treaty-based International Court of Justice).
47. Comm. on Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 204 (D.D.C. 2019) (noting that
the first OLC memorandum to assert that aides enjoyed absolute immunity in this context, a
1971 opinion authored by William Rehnquist, “does not cite to a single case that stands for
the asserted proposition, and the ten-plus subsequent publicly available statements by OLC
that DOJ points to in support of this immunity simply reference back to the 1971
Memorandum”).
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2. Internal Norm-Generating Effect
Apart from the direct role of practice in guiding the formal legal
interpretation of the president’s constitutional authority, practice has also
proven central to the establishment and maintenance of often powerful norms
of conduct inside the executive branch. Growing concern in recent years
about the abandonment of constitutional norms by both the executive and
legislative branches has helped nourish blossoming literature on the topic48
and has highlighted several illustrative examples of executive branch norms:
respect for judicial supremacy on constitutional questions,49 pursuit of a
deliberative decision-making process on questions of domestic and foreign
policy,50 recognition of basic legislative oversight powers,51 and access for a
pool of journalists to White House briefings.52 The list of manifestly
consequential examples likely extends quite a bit longer than this. While
scholars use varied terms to capture the phenomenon—norms, customs,
conventions—the core idea is that there exists a body of common
understandings, typically lacking formal status as law, that nonetheless has
the effect of “regulat[ing] the public behavior of actors who wield high-level
governmental authority, thereby guiding and constraining how these actors
‘exercise political discretion.’”53
Here, some further definition is necessary, for the relationship between
“practice” and “norms” in this context is not always straightforward. The
questions, for example, of where norms come from and how they emerge can
be vexed by the chicken-and-egg problem: did a particular habit or practice
give rise to the establishment of a “norm” or did the norm emerge, rather,
from a shared moral or political belief about the appropriate exercise of
power that itself gave rise to a repeated pattern of behavior? This dilemma
is reflected to an extent in existing definitional variation in the literature of
norms. In some conceptions, the existence of practical examples of a
particular behavior is effectively synonymous with the term “norm,” which
48. The literature has grown substantially in recent years. For a small sample, see, for
example, Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1433–34; David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the
Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014); Renan, supra note 9; Adrian Vermeule,
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2013); Keith E.
Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 1847.
49. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974).
50. Renan, supra note 9, at 2221–30 (origin of habit).
51. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Couns. to the President, for All
Executive Department and Agency General Counsels on Congressional Requests to
Departments and Agencies Protected by Executive Privilege (Sept. 28, 1994), reprinted in
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL app. b at 97–98 (2020)
(“In circumstances involving communications relating to investigations of personal
wrongdoing by government officials, it is our practice not to assert executive privilege, either
in judicial proceedings or in congressional investigations . . . .”).
52. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 9–10, CNN v. Trump, No 18-cv02610 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2018).
53. Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1433–34 (quoting Whittington, supra note 48, at
1860).
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is defined as little more than “expected behavioral patterns or regularities,”
full stop.54 In other accounts, lived practice is but one of several methods by
which a relevant norm might form; as British Commonwealth constitutional
scholar A. V. Dicey understood it, normative influence can be achieved
through “conventions, understandings, habits, or practices which, though
they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign
power . . . are not in reality laws at all.”55
Nevertheless, whether past practice accounts for some or all of the reasons
why a particular norm comes to exist, there seems to be widespread
agreement on at least some definitional points of special relevance here.
First, practice is part and parcel of what makes a norm—either because
practice contributed to the norm’s development and/or because practice can
be important evidence that a norm now exists.56 Second, a norm, once in
existence, becomes an independent justification for continuing to adhere to
it, all apart from the reasons for its origin in the first place,57 or whether it
may be formally codified in law in the second. Explanations for why norms
have this effect vary. By one account, “[h]istorical practice is important in
part because of its potential to reflect collective wisdom generated by the
judgments of numerous actors over time.”58 Another view holds that
bureaucracies have a tendency to generate structures that reinforce practical
inertia.59 But whether because of a shared belief in the value of collective
wisdom or because of some behavioral characteristic of bureaucracies, a
norm’s mere existence can provide (in the present context) executive branch
actors an independent reason to observe it. Finally, a key part of what
distinguishes a “norm” from any other form of government behavior is that
its violation is met with some form of practical (i.e., social, political,
professional, or bureaucratic) disapproval.60 Even in the absence of formal
legal sanction, the violation of a norm brings about some negative
consequences.61 It is in no small measure for this reason that norms can play
a significant role in shaping executive branch conduct day-to-day.
54. Renan, supra note 9, at 2197 (citing Richard Fallon, What Are “Norms” and
“Conventions?” (2018) (unpublished manuscript)); see also Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25,
at 1433 (adopting Phillip Pettit’s understanding of norms as “‘regularities of behavior in a
society’ that do not have the status of law but that, ‘as a matter of shared awareness, most
members conform to . . . and most are reinforced in this pattern of behavior by that
expectation’” (quoting PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 128 (2012))).
55. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION cxli (8th
ed. 1915).
56. See Renan, supra note 9, at 2197.
57. Pozen, supra note 48, at 31 (“Like laws, conventions . . . are typically thought to
provide content-independent reasons for compliance.” (citing Frederick Schauer, Authority
and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1935–40 (2008))).
58. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 426 (citing EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1987) (1790)).
59. See Renan, supra note 9, at 2276 (observing that bureaucratic structures grow up
around the norm and have the effect of reinforcing it).
60. Id. at 2198.
61. See, e.g., Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1439 (citing Vermeule, supra note 48, at
1182).
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A final point (for now) about the role of practice in shaping internal
executive branch norms: politically appointed executive branch officials
commonly come to office with existing, even entrenched, expectations about
the nature and scope of at least some aspects of executive power. Especially
in circumstances where the formal law of executive power is obscure or
unsettled, decision makers’ instincts about what may be done may play an
outsized role in establishing the scope of reasonable policy debate. Although
internal administrative structures, from executive branch legal counsel to,
ultimately, presidents themselves, can influence and even alter these
understandings in the context of particular policy decisions,62 it would be
unsurprising for a policy official who knows that “presidents have done this
in the past” to assume equally that “presidents can do this,” unless and until
given credible reasons to think otherwise. Executive branch officials are, in
this respect, as susceptible as others to the impact of normative views about
the presidency that exist outside the executive branch—views that past
practice has also helped to shape. This phenomenon is discussed next.
3. External Norm-Generating Effect
A third way in which past practice can help shape the exercise of executive
power is in its ability to influence external expectations—the views of elected
officials, the media, voters, and others—about what kind of behavior is
accepted as normal, legitimate, or even “presidential” when pursued by the
executive branch. There can be little doubt that presidents need, and typically
care deeply about, the views of institutional and political actors outside the
executive branch. In purely instrumental terms, congressional support can
be essential in securing for any president the outcome she seeks. As Richard
Neustadt famously put it: “[The president] may try to lead the system: he is
bound to be its clerk.”63 Winning public opinion more broadly has indeed
become a central goal of the modern presidency, as “[p]residents regularly
‘go over the heads’ of Congress to the people at large in support of legislation
and other initiatives.”64 Perhaps most foundationally, support for executive
action over time helps sustain the legitimacy of the constitutional system.65
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to delve fully into complex
62. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).
63. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 184
(1990). Even, perhaps especially, when it comes to presidential war-making initiatives,
presidents understand that congressional buy-in (whether or not in the form of formal
legislation) is essential. As Howell and Pevehouse found, congressional views turn out to
influence presidential decisions to use force significantly. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C.
PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR
POWERS (2007); see also DOUGLAS L. KRINER, AFTER THE RUBICON: CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS,
AND THE POLITICS OF WAGING WAR (2010) (examining the effect of legislative mechanisms
for influencing the conduct of war).
64. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (2017).
65. Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV. CONST.
STUD. 101, 105 (2003) (“Legitimacy (where it exists) descends to specific legal acts from the
‘respect-worthiness’ . . . [of the] system, or practice, or ‘regime’ of government.”).
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questions of political legitimacy in its varied forms,66 it should seem
uncontroversial to suggest that conduct by a democratic institution perceived
as illegitimate by a popular majority faces an uncertain future at best. At a
minimum, this literature helps illustrate why a political actor interested in
securing popular support might be interested in assuring the public that
actions are not only justified but “appropriate” assertions of power.67
Given such imperatives, it should be unsurprising to find that presidents
have regularly invoked past executive practice in helping to advance
initiatives these constituencies might perceive as abnormal. In much the
same way that judges traditionally rely on past case authority as an
independent justification for a decision, independent of whether they actually
agreed with the outcome in the original case,68 presidents commonly invoke
prior executive practice to provide public reassurance and secure support for
present action—not only among members of Congress and the public but also
among elite thinkers and writers who tend to shape reputational assessments.
Defending his resort to emergency authority to support the construction of
his border wall, President Trump thus, uncharacteristically, invoked
President Barack Obama’s use of the same statutory authority (albeit for
different purposes) in support of his controversial assertion of power at the
border.69 Likewise, President Obama publicly defended his decision to defer
adverse immigration action against individuals brought to the United States
as children, in part, on similar grounds: “The actions I’m taking are not only
lawful, they’re the kinds of actions taken by every single Republican
President and every single Democratic President for the past half century.”70
66. For a useful conceptual map distinguishing sociological, moral, and legal forms of
legitimacy, see RICHARD H. FALLON JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 20–41
(2018).
67. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1795 (2005) (“[D]efining legitimacy by reference to ‘a conception of obligation to obey any
commands an authority issues so long as that authority is acting within appropriate limits.’”
(quoting TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26 (1990))).
68. See generally Schauer, supra note 57.
69. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Trump’s National Emergency Press Conference, Annotated,
WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/15/trumpsbewildering-national-emergency-press-conference-annotated [https://perma.cc/9FHH-CE5N]
(“[W]e’re going to be signing, today—and registering—national emergency. And it’s a great
thing to do, because we have an invasion of drugs, invasion of gangs, invasion of people and
it’s unacceptable. And by signing the national emergency, something signed many times by
other presidents, many, many times—President Obama, in fact, we may be using one of the
national emergencies that he signed having to do with cartels, criminal cartels. It’s a very
good emergency that he signed . . . .”); see also Gregory Korte, Trump Defends Arpaio
Pardon; Lists Other Infamous Uses of the Power, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2017, 10:12 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/08/28/trump-defends-arpaio-pardonlists-other-infamous-uses-power/609317001 [https://perma.cc/PF7L-F9K2]; Remarks by
President Trump and President Niinistö of Finland in Joint Press Conference, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Aug. 28, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-president-niinisto-finland-joint-press-conference
[https://perma.cc/2SCJ9N8N].
70. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE
(Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/
20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/3U6L-78XX].
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Without conducting a full survey of modern presidential oratory, even
cursory searches reveal that reliance on past practice as a tool of presidential
rhetorical persuasion abounds.71
The converse effect is likewise much in evidence, as critics of particular
executive actions regularly invoke, among its worst qualities, the action’s
“unprecedented” nature. Using the term “unprecedented” with reference to
one or more aspects of the Trump administration’s conduct is pervasive, from
references to the president’s firing of Director of the FBI James Comey and
the administration’s categorical refusal to comply with congressional
subpoenas, to the president’s business-related conflicts of interest and use of
Twitter as a method of communication.72 Yet the “unprecedented” critique
is in fact a perennial chestnut of presidential criticism, as opponents of
executive branch action have strived to weaken public support for particular
actions.73 Just as norms, once established, become independent reasons for
their own continuation within a bureaucracy, the normal or abnormal nature
of presidential conduct—as evinced by the presence or absence of past
practice—remains a powerful, or at least common, ground for influencing
71. Among further examples, see February 4, 1997: State of the Union Address, MILLER
CTR. (Feb. 4, 1997), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/february-41997-state-union-address [https://perma.cc/L3QQ-68HA] (“Almost exactly 50 years ago, in
the first winter of the Cold War, President Truman stood before a Republican Congress and
called upon our country to meet its responsibilities of leadership . . . . That Congress, led by
Republicans like Senator Arthur Vandenberg, answered President Truman’s call. Together,
they made the commitments that strengthened our country for 50 years. Now let us do the
same.”); Transcript of President’s Address on Nuclear Strategy Toward Soviet Union, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 23, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/23/world/transcript-of-presidents-address-on-nuclear-strategy-toward-soviet-union.html
[https://perma.cc/4H2N-D6FS]
(“We must replace and modernize our forces, and that’s why I’ve decided to proceed with the
production and deployment of the new ICBM known as the MX. Three earlier Presidents
worked to develop this missile.”).
72. Matthew Ingram, The 140-Character President, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Fall
2017),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/trump-twitter-tweets-president.php
[https://
perma.cc/BS5F-F2HB] (“The president’s use of a public platform like Twitter to talk directly
with the American people is unprecedented for the presidency . . . .”); Kerry W. Kircher,
Trump’s Unprecedented Fight to Withhold Information, ATLANTIC (Aug. 27, 2019), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/house-needs-its-subpoena-power-againsttrump/596857 [https://perma.cc/S4FZ-XMVP] (“The Trump administration—as it has in so
many other dangerous ways—again has set itself apart, this time in the unprecedented degree
to which it has resisted congressional oversight. In the space of just a few months, Trump has
declared war on the House’s investigation of the executive branch . . . .”); Richard C. Paddock
et al., Potential Conflicts Around the Globe for Trump, the Businessman President, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/us/politics/donald-trumpinternational-business.html [https://perma.cc/6WUF-WQNB]; White House Announced
Firing of James Comey, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/05/09/us/politics/document-White-House-Fires-James-Comey.html [https://perma.cc/
XG25-VNKX].
73. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S
UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2015); Andy
Worthington, George W. Bush’s Torture Program Began Ten Years Ago, ANDY
WORTHINGTON (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2012/02/14/george-wbushs-torture-program-began-ten-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/EWW5-M4PB] (“Depriving
prisoners seized in wartime of the protections of the Geneva Conventions was a huge and
unprecedented step, and thoroughly alarming.”).
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the views of Congress and the public more broadly. The expectation that
past practice can play such a significant and persuasive role in securing
popular or political approval for present action means that much depends not
only on the strength of the claim that a particular past action actually occurred
as described but also on the conviction that current perceptions of the past
action remain favorable or neutral enough to still be well received.
B. Practical Canons and Anticanons
Why and how might the task of canonical collection help shed light on
how presidential practice informs the conduct of government today? It may
help to consider, by way of definition, a canonical context law professors
know well—canons of judicial opinions, collected for various purposes.74
Constitutional law casebooks, for example, feature a core set of cases year
after year, the cases “law professors and casebooks recognize as minimally
necessary for students to attain professional competence in constitutional
law,” the “set of decisions whose correctness participants in constitutional
argument must always assume.”75 While there is ample disagreement around
some parts of what students of constitutional law must learn, the canon can
be said to comprise at least an agreed-upon core of opinions collected for that
purpose. To be sure, promoting the attainment of professional competence
is but one of any number of purposes around which one might identify a
constitutional canon. Variant canons of judicial opinions might be thought
“necessary [to ensure] cultural literacy for citizens in a democracy” or to
“serve as benchmarks for testing academic theories about the law.”76 For
present purposes, it may suffice to note that what distinguishes a canon in
this sense from any old list is not the purpose for which the materials are
collected but rather that constituents relevant to the purpose of the list agree
that the content of the list is so. One set of cases is canonical for pedagogical
purposes because lawyers, judges, and professors agree that they are so. A
potentially different set of cases is canonical for theoretical study because
scholars agree that they are so.
Identifying canons of any kind among executive branch “precedents”
presents a somewhat different problem. For better or worse, there is no
professional school for presidents and accordingly no canon of presidential
practice for presidency training purposes. Presidential practice unmistakably
matters in other ways, but the precedential effects identified in the preceding
section require for their achievement the engagement of a range of
constituencies. To understand whether a particular practice has had
interpretive effect on constitutional meaning, one could look in the first
instance to the Supreme Court—if the Court has noted a practice as evidence
of meaning, then surely it would count as one indicator in favor of finding
that practice useful in that sense. To understand whether the practice has
helped to form an internal executive branch norm, one can look to executive
74. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 970; Greene, supra note 11, at 474.
75. Greene, supra note 11, at 381.
76. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 969.
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branch memoranda, statements, and subsequent executive branch conduct for
evidence of collective agreement. Finding a practice repeated over time,
across both Republican and Democratic administrations, seems a strong
indicator of norm-creating or norm-sustaining status. Finally, to understand
whether a practice has had any common normative impact on public
expectations, one might look to subsequent legislative responses, public
polling data, and other indicia of popular political opinion. Practices greeted
with widespread, consistent favor (or at the very least, noncontroversy)
among these groups over time seem good candidates for establishing such an
effect.
Yet while agreement about precedential effect (or canonical status) might
be discerned from a variety of formal and informal actions that all of these
institutions and actors are capable of taking—judicial opinions, legislation,
public statements, and more—it must be noted that existing structures give
these actors, at best, sharply limited incentives to express a judgment about
canonical presidential behavior in any regular way. The courts’ jurisdiction
is limited to cases and controversies, and canonical practice seems, by its
nature, unlikely to have generated much of either.77 Likewise, while current
justices have professional, ethical obligations to care about what past justices
have held, a current president has no such duty. The absence of citation or
reference to past presidential conduct in records of present decision-making
might be notable in some circumstances, but given the vastness of the body
of actions on which to rely, a president’s decision to cite or even replicate a
past president’s behavior seems not especially persuasive evidence of
anything other than the proposition that presidents sometimes do and
sometimes do not use examples of past practice to support the achievement
of their current ends. Indeed, it may well be a feature of good executive
branch conduct, however regularly repeated or praiseworthy, that it most
often produces little in the way of conscious, collective acknowledgement,
or even agreed-upon definition, in either political branch. And even wellknown presidential actions, however widely praised, may be so tied to unique
circumstances as to have, at best, uncertain effect on present governance.
What normative insight may current governing institutions draw from, say,
President Abraham Lincoln’s proclamation freeing enslaved peoples? A
norm about racial equality? Or one about presidential power?
Disfavored executive actions, by contrast, tend to produce substantial, and
often quite detailed, records—in reactions by the courts, Congress, official
and popular opinion, and more. Instances of executive practice that have
been formally condemned by all of these constituencies produce records that
might give us more confidence in concluding that there exists general and
shared recognition that such a practice satisfies our criteria for anticanonical
status—that is, presidential conduct so unacceptable that no court would look
to such an action as evidence of constitutional meaning, and no political
institution or constituency would look to that practice for any norm of official

77. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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conduct other than the opposite of what the practice reflects.78 Whether or
not a canonical set of presidential practices can be identified, well-known
acts that have suffered such formal institutional condemnation—in the form
of, say, a negative decision on the matter by the Supreme Court and
legislation codifying a contrary rule by Congress—might at least yield a list
of practices reliably and broadly recognized as anticanonical in effect.
But however valuable formal institutional condemnation might be in
identifying candidates for anticanonical practice, it is not altogether clear that
such evidence should be required to establish a practice’s anticanonical
status. Consider, for example, the executive practice challenged in
Korematsu v. United States,79 a case that has surely earned its place among
anticanonical Supreme Court decisions, at least in the “not law” sense.
Whether measuring by negative references in scholarly articles,
constitutional law casebooks, testimony in judicial confirmation hearings, or
negative references in subsequent cases and legislation directly,80 the Court’s
1944 decision had settled comfortably among the “haunted houses of
constitutional law,”81 even before the Court formally—and finally—
repudiated it in 2018.82
Just as it had become clear that Korematsu was a dead letter long before it
was formally overturned, one might also imagine that President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s executive order83 authorizing the military to affect the mass
exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was equally no longer
good practice on which to rely—either as evidence of constitutional meaning
or as contributing to some positive internal or external norm of presidential
conduct. On brief inspection, the proposition seems at least plausible.
Notwithstanding the President George W. Bush administration’s evident
interest in a wide-ranging counterterrorism detention program beginning in
2001, neither Justice Department litigators nor OLC lawyers invoked
Roosevelt’s practical example in support of their otherwise extraordinarily
broad claims of Article II power in that era.84 Even as the George W. Bush
administration relied liberally on other examples of presidential practice in
its OLC opinions and briefs, the example of that particular action of the
Roosevelt administration was never cited.85 President George W. Bush did
78. See infra Part II (evaluating potential examples of such practices).
79. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
80. Greene, supra note 11, at 388–402 (detailing popular, political, and formal
disapproval of Korematsu).
81. Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v.
Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 487 (2002).
82. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“The forcible relocation of U.S.
citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively
unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority . . . . Korematsu was gravely wrong
the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no
place in law under the Constitution.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248
(Jackson, J., dissenting))).
83. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938–1942).
84. Greene, supra note 11, at 400–02.
85. While President George W. Bush famously issued an executive order authorizing
detention and military trials after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the order aimed at those
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not invoke the example in defending his own detention practices in public
speeches. And while the administration made extensive use of existing
criminal and immigration statutes to detain hundreds of individuals amidst
daily fears of additional domestic attacks,86 even detaining a handful of
American citizens as “enemy combatants,”87 it stopped short of adopting the
Roosevelt approach—deploying the military to affect the wholesale
exclusion of a class of individuals from their homes. Why?
It is tempting to assume that no such action could have been contemplated
since the law had changed in other important respects by 2001. That is, one
might assume the president did not have the military conduct mass sweeps
of, say, Saudi-, Afghan-, or even Muslim-American nationals from New
York or other putatively threatened cities because Congress had long since
passed, in express rejection of Roosevelt’s Korematsu order, the NonDetention Act of 197188 (NDA), proscribing the detention of U.S. citizens
except by an act of Congress. Yet the administration was certainly aware—
indeed, the Supreme Court itself had agreed as much by 2004—that the
statutory Authorization for Use of Military Force89 (AUMF) Congress had
enacted in the days after September 11, 2001, qualified as an act of Congress
to satisfy the NDA’s requirement.90 Thus, the statute alone does not explain
neglect of the Roosevelt administration’s past practice.
It is also possible that policymakers inside the George W. Bush
administration concluded that such a practice would simply not be helpful in
advancing their counterterrorism policy goals. There are indeed plenty of
security policy reasons to conclude that the exclusion and internment of
Japanese-Americans on the West Coast was a time-wasting diversion of
military resources and personnel that could have been far more effectively
used elsewhere. Yet in addition to the “enemy combatant” detentions of a
handful of American citizens in the United States, the administration had
pursued significant (if on a smaller scale than Korematsu) counterterrorism
detention operations against noncitizens during that time period, operations
aimed overwhelmingly at men from predominantly Muslim countries.91 It
thus seems hard to argue that the administration thought large, class-based

who were part of Al Qaeda or had worked to prepare or commit terrorist attacks, rather than
at a general population or place. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002),
reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C. § 801.
86. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (describing some of these
practices).
87. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 430 (2004); Plea Agreement ¶ 1, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37 (E.D. Va. July
15, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/pleaagreement.htm [https://perma.cc/NFL8-S42M].
88. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
89. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note).
90. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.
91. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667 (describing some of these practices); see also OFF. OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS
HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER
11 ATTACKS 16–22 (April 2003), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UDN8-GDLJ] (helpful statistics regarding the topic).
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detention operations would be categorically unlikely to help their
counterterrorism initiatives.
An alternative possibility is thus at least worth considering—namely, that
the administration believed that invocation or repetition of President
Roosevelt’s practical example would neither advance their claims legally,
nor aid their cause politically. The mass exclusion and detention of a raceor religion-based class of U.S. citizens could not persuasively be invoked as
a gloss on the meaning of the president’s power under Article II; and it set
no favorable marker likely to enhance public perceptions of the wisdom,
legitimacy, or even presidentialness of any executive action going forward.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s formal judicial validation of
Roosevelt’s exclusion order in Korematsu, neither relying on nor replicating
Roosevelt’s practice would be likely to secure the president any advantage.
Put differently, it is possible members of the Bush administration, for these
or other reasons, viewed the Japanese-American internment example as
anticanonical in nature—that is, an example of past practice so generally
recognized as mistaken that it is has come to set a standard for what the
executive branch should not do.
As straightforward as it might seem, selecting the Japanese-American
exclusion example as Exhibit A in a hypothetical catalog of anticanonical
practices also underscores the complexity of defining such a practice set.
Among other things, real-time condemnation of the particular practice as
such may be too much—and the wrong thing—to ask. After all, the
putatively anticanonical practice of Japanese-American exclusion was
initially welcomed with broad popular support,92 congressional inaction, and
(in critical part) formal judicial validation.93 The following decades did
eventually produce general legislation aimed at preventing the future
detention of Americans without an act of Congress94 and, forty years later, a
writ of coram nobis for Fred Korematsu in particular.95 But might it not have
been possible that the practice had achieved anticanonical status—such that
no court would affirmatively rely on it and no executive would embrace it—
even before the courts formally acknowledged error? Indeed, it seems
plausible to imagine anticanonical status quite commonly emerging
iteratively over time or at least over a longer period of time than allowed by
the window in which formal institutional invalidation (because of mootness
or analogous constraints) was possible to achieve.
92. Carl M. Cannon, Trump, Unlearning the Lessons of Internment, REALCLEARPOLITICS
(Dec. 13, 2015), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/12/13/trump_unlearning_
the_lessons_of_internment_129011.html [https://perma.cc/HBQ6-GWPM]; Art Swift,
Gallup Vault: WWII-Era Support for Japanese Internment, GALLUP (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://news.gallup.com/vault/195257/gallup-vault-wwii-era-support-japaneseinternment.aspx [https://perma.cc/AEP6-GQQN]; Paul Thornton, Opinion, In 1942, We
Favored Japanese Internment. Shame on Us, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.
latimes.com/la-ol-opinion-newsletter-japanese-internment-20170225-htmlstory.html [https://
perma.cc/HT6D-3ALH].
93. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
95. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1416–18 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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Given the Court’s regular reliance on presidential practice (and legislative
acquiescence) in assessing the constitutionality of executive action, it is
certainly sensible to begin by consulting what, if anything, courts have said
about a particular practice and what, if anything, Congress has done in
response. But at least as an initial position, our evaluation of candidates for
inclusion in an executive branch anticanon should consider not only actions
that one or the other branches of government has rejected through traditional,
formal means (i.e., enacted laws and decided cases) but also actions that have
been treated negatively by the courts, the political branches, and the public
as evidenced in other ways. Examples may include congressional hearings,
opinions of executive branch legal counsel, the statements of executive
branch policymakers and their elite contemporaries in practice and academe,
subsequent patterns of use, and iterative exchanges among all of these actors
not just in reliance on the example but in nonreliance where institutional
conventions might otherwise expect to produce it.
That decision, too, carries complex consequences. For it is almost
inconceivable that, looking across such a wide range of sources over such an
extended period of time, one would not encounter some indication that at
least someone in these circles, perhaps depending on partisan affiliation, still
views the practice as acceptable or at least not so unacceptable as to be
beyond contemplation—or even so attractive as to be worth repeating in
some form. Indeed, during Donald Trump’s campaign for the presidency, he
famously called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States,” later defending his proposal in a televised interview by noting
that President Roosevelt “did the same thing,” referencing the internment of
Japanese-Americans.96 Does the favorable mention of the putatively
anticanonical incident—followed by an attempt to implement a version of
the policy the incident was invoked to defend—suffice to take the Korematsu
practice out of the running for anticanonical status? Or, might the
anticanonical status of a presidential practice survive its occasional
invocation? Might formal action by a handful of official institutions or a
majority of scholars suffice to establish anticanonical status, or should
evidence of bipartisan condemnation be required? How much and what kind
of rejection of the practice one might conclude suffices to preserve a practice
as anticanonical in such circumstances may need to await consideration of
specific examples. For if the age of constitutional hardball97 has
demonstrated anything, it is that assumptions about which norms are beyond
contestation is perhaps narrower than one might have imagined.
Finally, for present purposes, one might narrow the range of possible
candidates further by focusing on executive actions that have any chance of
producing any of the precedential effects described: actions that might shape
constitutional meaning, create norms of conduct inside the executive branch,

96. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing
President Trump’s televised remarks).
97. See generally Tushnet, supra note 14.

2020]

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANTICANON

619

or help define the terms of legitimate presidential conduct outside it.98 One
might likewise select examples only from executive actions well or widely
enough known to have produced not only a documented internal response
(such that might evince an internal executive branch norm) but also have
served as a normative touchstone one way or another in the public mind. And
given the prospect that anticanonical status may develop over time, the
inquiry can also limit the focus to actions that happened long enough ago to
see how various institutions have responded. In this respect, inquiring minds
might prefer actions based on decisions that were bound to recur and indeed,
that have recurred in more than one administration—the kind of actions for
which it might be possible for a pattern of behavior over time to emerge.
II. EVALUATING CANDIDATES FOR AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANTICANON
Unlike judicial canons and anticanons, the absence of a singular collection
of presidential actions assembled for the purpose of, for example,
professional training, means the inquiry necessarily starts from a blanker
slate; this inquiry cannot be exhaustive but merely illustrative. The idea here
is to test the criteria just sketched by offering a set of incidents for
consideration—some that seem near certain candidates for inclusion in an
executive branch anticanon, some less certain—in the hope that one might
better define not just where to look but how to identify anticanonical practice.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the examples that follow are taken
from incidents that are both broadly ill regarded today and in broad contours
historically well-known; they involve the kinds of decisions that could have
constitutional implications bound to recur and indeed, that have recurred in
more than one presidency; and they are limited to modern actions (to
maximize the likelihood of contemporary relevance) but that are at least
twenty-five-years old so that subsequent use over time can be observed. The
illustrative actions assessed here—involving the handling of investigations
into the president, the sharing of information with Congress, and the decision
to use force—meet each of these criteria. They also help define our inquiry
further before we turn to consider what anticanonical practice might tell us
about the current contingencies of executive power.
A. Terminating an Investigation into the President
Among potential candidates for anticanonical practice, President Richard
Nixon’s decision in October 1973 to fire Watergate special prosecutor
Archibald Cox seems reasonably low-hanging fruit. After promising the
House Judiciary Committee in confirmation hearings that he would appoint
a special prosecutor to investigate the Watergate matter, newly appointed
Attorney General Elliot Richardson selected Cox for the post in May 1973.
With Nixon’s former attorney general, John Mitchell, and others, already
facing charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in federal court in
98. It is surely only a small subset of everything presidents have done that has even
arguable constitutional significance.
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Washington, D.C., Cox filed and won a motion in the trial court for a
subpoena compelling the president to turn over newly discovered White
House audio tapes thought relevant to the ongoing proceedings. After Cox
refused White House attempts to offer compromise transcripts of the tapes
instead, the president ordered Richardson to fire Cox. When both Richardson
and his Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, refused the
president’s order and resigned, it fell to Solicitor General Robert Bork to
carry out the president’s command.99
While questions surrounding the scope of the president’s removal power,
and the constitutionality of independent counsel, have arisen in the courts
repeatedly in the decades since, there is no evidence that Nixon’s actions in
this episode have influenced constitutional meaning in this realm, except
arguably to support measures to restrict executive authority. The direct
constitutionality of the president’s actions that night was never seriously
contested. Among the few public officials who spoke immediately in defense
of Nixon’s conduct, several emphasized that the president surely had
authority to fire his subordinates at the Justice Department.100 While
subsequently adopted regulations imposed important limits on the president’s
ability to remove Cox’s successor special counsel,101 the Supreme Court had
no occasion to address the converse question—whether Congress could
constitutionally limit the president’s authority to remove an independent
counsel engaged in investigating the president—until 1988, when the postWatergate independent counsel statute, passed as part of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978,102 came before it in Morrison v. Olson.103 Enacted
a decade earlier, the statute provided that an independent counsel could only
be removed from office by impeachment or by “the personal action of the
Attorney General,” and then “only for good cause, physical or mental
disability,” “or any other condition that substantially impairs” the
independent counsel’s performance.104 The Morrison Court upheld the
statute as not unduly interfering with the separation of powers or the
president’s power under Article II.105

99. For detailed historical accounts, see, for example, FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE
CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON (1994); BOB
WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS: THE CLASSIC, BEHIND-THE-SCENES
ACCOUNT OF RICHARD NIXON’S DRAMATIC LAST DAYS IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1976).
100. See, e.g., Jules Witcover, Pressure for Impeachment Mounting, WASH. POST (Oct. 21,
1973), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pressure-for-impeachment-mounting/2012/
06/04/gJQAd9f6IV_story.html?utm_term=.91a1320cb755 [https://perma.cc/KL97-6ZUE]
(quoting, among others, Kansas Republican Senator Bob Dole, as saying, “I don’t know what
other choice the President had . . . . [i]t’s a question of who’s the President—Nixon or Cox”).
101. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694–95 (1974) (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 30,739
(Nov. 7, 1973), amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32,805 (Nov. 19, 1973)).
102. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
103. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
105. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696–97.
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Yet while the Court’s conclusion met with vigorous dissent at the time106
and scholarly criticism since,107 perhaps most striking about the Morrison
opinions is what they do not do. Neither the majority nor the dissent even
attempt to leverage past presidential practice to illuminate the muchcontested constitutional meaning (here, the putatively exclusive nature of the
executive’s control over prosecutors, even special counsel, in the Justice
Department). Notwithstanding the majority’s direct reference to Steel
Seizure,108 not even the dissent noted that, as a matter of historical practice,
presidents have acted to remove even “independent” counsels more than
once.109 At least one of those occasions—Nixon’s, just fifteen years
earlier—involved a presidential removal seemingly contrary to the
requirements of then applicable Justice Department regulations, enacted
pursuant to statute.110 To the extent the event played any role in the Justices’
thinking, it at most supported the opposite result.111
It is hard to imagine that the Court’s inattention to presidential practice in
this realm was merely an oversight. From the moment it became public,
President Nixon’s decision to order Cox’s dismissal was radically
unpopular.112 Gallup conducted a public poll on the question of whether the
president should be impeached and tracked a notable uptick in support for
impeachment after the events of the Saturday Night Massacre.113 The
Washington Post reported the following day that demands for impeachment
among members of both parties in Congress were mounting swiftly, with
even Republican leaders describing the president’s action as having
“precipitated a constitutional crisis.”114 Within days of the Saturday events,
106. Id. at 697–734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2133 (1998).
108. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))).
109. See ANDREW COAN, PROSECUTING THE PRESIDENT: HOW SPECIAL PROSECUTORS HOLD
PRESIDENTS ACCOUNTABLE AND PROTECT THE RULE OF LAW 24–29 (2019) (recounting, for
example, President Ulysses S. Grant’s action removing his previously appointed special
counsel).
110. Establishing the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688,
14,688 (June 4, 1973) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.37), formally established the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force. On the question of removal, the regulation provided: “The Special
Prosecutor will not be removed from his duties except for extraordinary improprieties on his
part.” Id.
111. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (“Congress, of course, was concerned when it created
the office of independent counsel with the conflicts of interest that could arise in situations
when the Executive Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking officers.”).
112. See, e.g., KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 361–62 (1997)
(describing a “firestorm” of public opinion in response to what was soon called the “Saturday
Night Massacre”).
113. Lydia Saad, Gallup Vault: More Said ‘Fire Nixon’ After Nixon Fired Cox, GALLUP
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/vault/226370/gallup-vault-fire-nixon-nixon-firedcox.aspx [https://perma.cc/3TS6-5FMM].
114. Witcover, supra note 100 (quoting Illinois Republican John B. Anderson, Chair of the
House Republican Conference).
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multiple members of Congress introduced resolutions calling, variously, for
impeachment, investigation, and the appointment of a new Watergate special
prosecutor.115 Just over a week later, the House Judiciary Committee voted
to begin issuing subpoenas, a first step toward impeachment.116 Two of the
three articles of impeachment eventually adopted by the House Judiciary
Committee the following summer cite the president’s interference with “the
office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force” as among the grounds for
impeachment.117 At the same time, Congress opened discussions on the
prospect of legislation to establish a regular independent prosecutor shortly
after Cox’s firing. Those discussions produced extensive hearings and
ultimately, the passage of the Ethics in Government Act,118 creating the
office of “independent counsel” to investigate high-ranking government
officials alleged to have violated federal criminal law. Under the law the
Supreme Court eventually upheld in Morrison, the independent counsel
could only be removed from office by impeachment or by “the personal
action of the Attorney General,” and then “only for good cause, physical or
mental disability,” “or any other condition that substantially impairs” the
independent counsel’s performance.119
But perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of recognizing Cox’s firing as
anticanonical practice is the subsequent behavior of the executive branch
itself. Despite multiple investigations launched under the authority of the
independent counsel statute and subsequent Justice Department regulations,
no president since Nixon has fired an independent counsel appointed to
investigate his conduct. Indeed, notwithstanding sweeping and highly
controversial investigations into both President Ronald Reagan (by Lawrence
Walsh operating under the Ethics in Government Act) and President Bill
Clinton (by Ken Starr, operating under the same authority),120 neither Walsh
nor Starr gave any indication in their lengthy final reports of any executive
branch attempt to terminate their investigations.121 The recently concluded
investigation of President Trump and the Trump campaign by Special
Counsel Robert Mueller is in this respect dramatically different.122 The
115. 119 CONG. REC. 34,871–73 (1973).
116. James M. Naughton, House Panel Starts Inquiry on Impeachment Question, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/10/31/archives/house-panel-startsinquiry-on-impeachment-question-approves-wide.html [https://perma.cc/WWY6-FGAQ].
117. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 2 (1974).
118. Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–
594). For a more detailed chronology of this legislative history, see Constance O’Keefe &
Peter Safirstein, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An
Examination of the Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor
Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 113, 118 nn.27–29 (1983).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
120. See COAN, supra note 109, at 64–86.
121. See KENNETH W. STARR, THE STARR REPORT: THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR ON PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFAIR (1998);
LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA
MATTERS (1993).
122. 1 SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019).
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Mueller report details multiple attempts by the president, calling on more
than a half dozen different individuals both in and out of government, to
terminate the Mueller investigation.123 Yet in recounting the response to the
president’s demands of multiple executive branch officials, including the
president’s handpicked attorney general and White House counsel, the
Mueller report usefully illuminates prevailing executive branch
understandings of the Nixon example. Beyond officials’ consistent refusals
to comply with the president’s demands,124 it seems clear the Nixon events
served as an influential, negative example. As former White House Counsel
Donald McGahn later told investigators, he did not want to be like “Saturday
Night Massacre Bork.”125
Such statements, coupled with Trump administration officials’ uniform
and repeated refusal to comply with the president’s demands, make for
particularly compelling evidence that Nixon’s conduct has come to serve as
“positive authority for the propositions [it] reject[s].”126 All lines of evidence
available to us support this conclusion. Despite opportunities, no court has
ever cited Nixon’s example (or that of, say, President Ulysses S. Grant) as
evidence that Congress’s ability to regulate independent counsel is
constitutionally limited. Public and official indicia suggest Nixon’s actions
have been widely and consistently rejected by both Congress and the public.
And executive branch officials themselves have either viewed it as
counterproductive, impossible, or out of the question for any subsequent
president to follow Nixon’s course. That is, Nixon’s action has come to stand
for a norm supporting the opposite of the practice he pursued: the president
should not be able to terminate an investigation into his own potentially
illegal activity by unilaterally removing investigative counsel.
If this example is persuasive, one might take some reassurance about the
accuracy of the preliminary assumptions above. That is, negative, even
profoundly negative, conduct by the president need not be formally rejected
by a court to be broadly recognized as such, but judicial or other official
nonreliance on the practice in the face of opportunities to do so can be
important evidence of anticanonical status. Negative presidential practice
can indeed be expected to produce a substantial record of consistent,
bipartisan condemnation in some form over time, though subsequent
examples below may help to illuminate how consistent this condemnation
need be. Finally, the nonrepetition of the practice across bipartisan
administrations and, perhaps more significant, the anticipation of adverse
123. 2 id. at 90–105.
124. Id. at 85.
125. Id. at 85–86; see also Questionnaire for Non-judicial Nominees, U.S. SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY (June 29, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Wray%20SJQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/C42C-ZUHQ] (showing responses of Christopher Wray
committing to protect the Mueller investigation during its pendency). The special counsel had
taken the position that this conduct is among evidence that the president committed obstruction
of justice, for which he may be criminally prosecuted upon leaving office. See 2 MUELLER III,
supra note 122, at 92–95.
126. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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professional or reputational consequences in the event of repetition (as
evinced in the McGahn testimony), seems to satisfy common definitions of
how norms function.127 Notwithstanding countervailing pressures (including
even presidential direction), norms can certainly exert an independent pull
on current governing decisions—and anticanonical norms can be expected to
exert an especially strong one.
B. Concealing Use-of-Force Operations from Congress
If the Saturday Night Massacre might serve for present purposes as a
paradigmatic example of anticanonical practice, many other examples of
presidential practice come with records that are more complex, even within
the same presidency.
Consider another example from the Nixon
administration. Beginning in March 1969, President Nixon ordered a major
air bombing campaign in Cambodia, a significant expansion of the ongoing
conflict in Vietnam into the territory of a new, previously neutral, country.128
While the scope of presidential war powers in many respects remains hotly
contested (and thus, at least in principle, unlikely to produce clear
anticanonical examples), the practice of potential anticanonical interest here
is not the introduction of forces but rather the decision to undertake these
operations without any notification (before or after commencement) to
Congress. At the president’s insistence, none of the relevant congressional
committees were notified that the president had decided to extend the use of
military force into a third country whose neutrality the United States
otherwise publicly recognized.129 Indeed, in response to the president’s
insistence upon secrecy, the Pentagon developed an elaborate “dual
reporting” system, making it possible for pilots and navigators involved in
the missions to file reports of fuel and ordinance use but ensuring that even
the Pentagon’s already secret records would falsely show no indication of
any bombing runs into Cambodia.130 After one military flight supervisor
expressed concern about the falsification of records and asked who they were
meant to keep the information from, he was reportedly told, “the Foreign
Relations Committee.”131 Apart from quiet, informal conversations with two
sympathetic senators and three representatives in the summer of 1969,132
Congress did not find out about the monthslong bombing campaign until July
1973, when a whistleblower reported it.133
Unlike constitutional questions surrounding restrictions on presidential
removal power and the legality of independent counsel schemes, the courts
have had scant opportunity to opine directly on any putative presidential
127. See supra Part I.A.2 (defining “norms”).
128. WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW: KISSINGER, NIXON, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
CAMBODIA 19–24 (1979).
129. Id. at 28–30.
130. Id. at 30.
131. See id. at 32, 214.
132. See generally SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON
WHITE HOUSE (1983).
133. SHAWCROSS, supra note 128, at 287.

2020]

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANTICANON

625

authority to withhold information about military operations from
Congress.134 While contemporaneous lawsuits challenged the legality of
Nixon’s Cambodia operations on the grounds that the president lacked
constitutional or statutory authorization to use force there, those lawsuits
were rejected (without reaching the merits) as posing nonjusticiable political
questions and, in any event, did not separately present questions about
secrecy or concealment.135 Congress and the executive have with some
regularity fought over congressional access to executive branch information,
although there remain no more than a handful of judicial decisions resolving
those disputes, which have been most commonly addressed through
interbranch negotiations.136 What cases exist—lower court decisions
involving various assertions of executive privilege—generally acknowledge
that a case for executive privilege may be stronger where national security is
at stake137 but consistently reject the notion of any absolute privilege
surrounding national security.138 None of these cases—and no decision of
the Supreme Court on any topic—makes reference to President Nixon’s
efforts to conceal information about the Cambodia campaign from
Congress.139

134. The actual falsification of official records was then, and remains today, a crime under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). See 10 U.S.C § 907(a)(1) (providing for the
criminal offense of submitting “any false record, return, regulation, order, or other official
document, knowing it to be false”). The offense of lying to Congress is also a crime under the
UCMJ. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making it a crime “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch” to “knowingly and willfully,” among other things,
“make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation”).
135. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974).
136. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42670, PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 7 (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42670.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NX9-5L7T].
137. See United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2013); Comm. on the
Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v. House of
Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983).
138. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The executive
would have it that the Constitution confers on the executive absolute discretion in the area of
national security. This does not stand up. While the Constitution assigns to the President a
number of powers relating to national security, . . . it confers upon Congress other powers
equally inseparable from the national security, such as the powers to declare war, raise and
support armed forces . . . .”); Comm. on Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 214
(D.D.C. 2019).
139. See GARVEY, supra note 136, at 21. Presidents have stated they will not use executive
privilege to block congressional inquiries into allegations of fraud, corruption, or other illegal
or unethical conduct in the executive branch. The Clinton administration announced that “[i]n
circumstances involving communications relating to investigations of personal wrongdoing
by government officials, it is our practice not to assert executive privilege, either in judicial
proceedings or in congressional investigations and hearings.” Id. Similarly, the Reagan
administration policy was to refuse to invoke executive privilege when faced with allegations
of illegal or unethical conduct: “[T]he privilege should not be invoked to conceal evidence of
wrongdoing or criminality on the part of executive officers.” Id. A significant application of
this policy came in the Iran-Contra investigations when President Reagan did not assert
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One might argue that the paucity of judicial engagement on the question
necessarily makes the Cambodia situation a weak candidate for anticanonical
status. Apart from what courts would think about the legality of the
president’s conduct if presented with the question, there is only the most
modest basis on which to assess the courts’ view of the constitutional
relevance of the Cambodian example given only indirect opportunities to
engage it. At the same time, if even judicial affirmation may not be enough
to save a practical example from anticanonical status (as in the detention
practice underlying Korematsu), surely judicial silence is not enough to
foreclose the prospect altogether. The lack of judicial engagement may be
especially unproblematic when other lines of evidence are available. In this
instance, even as the courts lacked occasion to opine directly on the
administration’s concealment of information from Congress, Congress itself
was eager to engage.
By the time the administration confirmed reports of the secret air campaign
on July 16, 1973,140 many members of Congress and the public were already
deeply unhappy with the Nixon administration over a combination of the still
emerging Watergate scandal141 and the United States’s massive, ongoing
combat operations in Southeast Asia.142 But it was news of the undisclosed
campaign in Cambodia (beginning more than a year earlier than Congress
and the public had been told) that triggered the first resolution calling for the
president’s impeachment.143 Introduced just two weeks after the Cambodia
revelations, the focus of the proposed article of impeachment was “not the
bombing itself nor even the secrecy . . . [but] rather[] its concealment from
the Congress” in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.144 The
resolution would eventually result in a fourth proposed article of
impeachment against President Nixon in July of the following year, alleging
that the president had acted in disregard of his duty to “take care that the laws
executive privilege and even made “relevant excerpts” of his personal diaries available to
congressional investigators. Id.
140. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, U.S. Confirms Pre-1970 Raids on Cambodia, N.Y.
TIMES (July 16, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/17/archives/us-confirms-pre1970raids-on-cambodia-bombing-protected-gis-says.html [https://perma.cc/9CKG-7UF9].
141. See, e.g., James M. Naughton, Surprise Witness: Butterfield, Ex-aide at White House,
Tells of Listening Devices, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/
07/17/archives/surprise-witness-butterfield-exaide-at-white-house-tells-of.html
[https://
perma.cc/D3NW-64B4].
142. See, e.g., ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER WATERGATE 81 (2006) (recounting that President Nixon
announced in 1970 that he had ordered 32,000 U.S. ground troops into combat across the
border).
143. Marjorie Hunter, House Gets Impeach-Nixon Resolution, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/08/01/archives/house-gets-impeachnixon-resolutionlittleused-provision-following.html?searchResultPosition=12
[https://perma.cc/5F5FDM76]. Representative Robert F. Drinan was clear in introducing the resolution that he was
moved to act “only after ‘recent revelation that President Nixon conducted a totally secret air
war in Cambodia for 14 months prior to April 30, 1970.’” Id.
144. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 308–09 (1974) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 requiring
that “a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall
be published from time to time”).
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be faithfully executed” by concealing from and lying to Congress about the
nature of U.S. bombing operations in Cambodia.145 While the House
Judiciary Committee ultimately voted not to support the fourth article, the
majority of those voting against it rejected it for reasons unrelated to their
views of the concealment itself—including, among other things, that the War
Powers Resolution146 (WPR), subsequently enacted by Congress in
November 1973, would now serve as a powerful deterrent against any
president repeating such conduct.147
Indeed, following the Cambodia revelations, Congress moved remarkably
quickly to adopt this significant new legislation regulating the president’s
conduct of both military- and (later) CIA-led covert operations abroad.
Having spent more than three years by that point debating whether and how
to restrict the president’s ability to send U.S. troops into hostilities abroad,
the House of Representatives finally passed its version of the WPR just three
days after the Cambodia revelations were confirmed.148 The final WPR was
enacted three months later and included provisions imposing both
congressional consultation and reporting requirements on the president.149
While the WPR has been the subject of much criticism, Congress readily
overrode the president’s initial veto to enact the bill into law, and presidents
since have submitted close to 200 reports to Congress regarding the
introduction of further troops into hostilities, or into circumstances where
hostilities are imminent, as the WPR requires.150 And public support for the
kind of congressional engagement the WPR requires of the president has
145. The Impeachment Inquiry, CQ ALMANAC ONLINE, https://library.cqpress.com/
cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal74-1223105#H2_1 [https://perma.cc/X4R7-QQ8W] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2020); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 308 (“In his conduct of the office of
President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath
faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability,
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in disregard of his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, on and subsequent to
March 17, 1969, authorized, ordered and ratified the concealment from the Congress of the
facts and the submission to the Congress of false and misleading statements concerning the
existence, scope and nature of American bombing operations in Cambodia in derogation of
the power of the Congress to declare war, to make appropriations and to raise and support
armies, and by such conduct warrants impeachment and trial and removal from office.”).
146. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–
1548).
147. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 327.
148. Richard L. Madden, House Passes Bill to Curb President’s War Power, N.Y. TIMES
(July 19, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/19/archives/house-passes-bill-to-curbpresidents-war-powers-house-passes-bill.html [https://perma.cc/3NKG-DLZN].
149. Section 1542 of the WPR provides that the president “in every possible instance shall
consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.” 50 U.S.C. § 1542. In such circumstances, § 1543 requires that the president
submit a written report to the House and Senate within forty-eight hours setting forth “the
circumstances necessitating the introduction of” forces, the constitutional and statutory
authority on which the introduction was based, and the “estimated scope and duration of the
hostilities or involvement.” Id. § 1543.
150. ELLEN C. COLLIER & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42699, THE WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 1, 68–94 (2019).
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remained remarkably consistent since. As the bipartisan National War
Powers Commission summarized in its 2018 report: “Despite changes in
historical context and the varying nature of external threats, the mood of the
American public has remained decidedly in favor of consultation prior to
committing American troops abroad.”151
Yet if such indicia might support the conclusion that the president’s
concealment of information about U.S. military operations from Congress
has earned anticanonical status among actors outside the executive branch—
such that the secrecy surrounding early Cambodia operations today serves as
practical justification for the maintenance of laws and norms to the opposite
effect—the evidence for its anticanonical status for executive branch actors
is more complex. Conventional wisdom among scholars and policy officials
remains that the WPR “tends to be honored in the breach rather than by
observance,”152 in substantial measure because the executive branch has
remained chronically resistant.153 OLC wrote in 2002 that it has “questioned
the WPR’s constitutionality on numerous occasions.”154 And presidential
administrations have not filed WPR reports on several occasions when they
believed that the introduction of forces under the circumstances did not rise
to the level of “hostilities” triggering the reporting requirement in article 4 of
the WPR.155 Even when WPR reports are submitted, as one account has it,
they are “relegated to lower-level executive personnel” and “stripped of so
much content in the interest of preserving secrecy as to make them hardly
useful.”156 In the meantime, because the WPR reporting and consultation
requirements apply only to the U.S. Armed Forces, presidents initially found
it possible to avoid its provisions by invoking separate statutory powers to
pursue covert action through the CIA.157
Indeed, Nixon’s Cambodia operation was not the last occasion on which
the executive branch attempted to keep information from Congress about
U.S. engagements in military conflicts outside the United States. The IranContra affair, which emerged publicly in 1986, concerned in part the Reagan
administration’s secret efforts to sell arms to Iran in exchange for the release
of American hostages and to use the proceeds of those sales to support the
military insurgency of the Contra rebels against the Nicaraguan government,
151. JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., MILLER CTR., NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION:
REPORT APPENDIX SIX 2 (2008), http://web1.millercenter.org/commissions/warpowers/
appsix.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2TL-CAPB] (citing the results of recurring Gallup polling).
152. Id. at 3. Congress chronically reports frustration with a lack of consultation required
by § 1542 of the WPR. See, e.g., COLLIER & GRIMMETT, supra note 150, at 1.
153. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
154. Auth. of the President Under Domestic and Int’l L. to Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26
Op. O.L.C. 143, 160 (2002); see also Overview of the War Powers Resol., 8 Op. O.L.C. 271,
275 (1984).
155. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 153, at 49 & n.171.
156. JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., MILLER CTR., NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION:
REPORT 23 (2008), http://web1.millercenter.org/reports/warpowers/report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MLZ5-RVDL].
157. See KOH, supra note 153, at 39.
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in violation of federal law prohibiting U.S. government assistance to the
group.158 To be sure, the incident was different from Nixon’s Cambodia
activities in multiple respects. Among others, the U.S. Armed Forces were
not themselves engaged in hostilities in Nicaragua, and what support the
United States did provide largely focused on arming and training the Contra
rebels and was channeled not through the military but through CIA
personnel, not covered by the terms of the WPR.159 Yet the dynamic was
broadly familiar: the executive, conscious that planned force-related
activities faced congressional opposition, this time in the form of explicit
statutory restrictions,160 worked actively to conceal its actions from
Congress.161
The conventional case thus features a seemingly damning collection of
executive efforts to circumvent post-Cambodia congressional notification
requirements: questioning the law’s constitutionality, avoiding the broad
application of legislative restrictions (through narrow exercises in statutory
interpretation), and on at least one highly visible set of occasions, failing to
comply with parallel disclosure requirements governing the activities of the
intelligence community. But far from undermining the existence of the
anticanonical norm fostered by the Cambodia precedent—a norm that at its
core rejects executive branch concealment of use of force operations from
Congress—there is strong reason to view the positions the executive took in
each of these instances as in fact having had the practical effect of
strengthening it.
Take the position of OLC, which has opined on multiple occasions on the
constitutionality and application of the WPR since its enactment.162
Notwithstanding the common assertion that “[e]very President since Ford has
questioned the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution,”163 only one
administration since President Nixon’s has expressly taken the position that
the WPR is in any respect unconstitutional—the George W. Bush

158. See, e.g., WALSH, supra note 121, at xv.
159. Id. at xviii–xix. Not long before the Iran-Contra scandal, Congress had learned that
the CIA had secretly mined Nicaraguan harbors in April 1984 without giving congressional
committees the (by then) statutorily required notice (at least in classified form). See id. at 2.
160. See Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 791, 96 Stat.
1830, 1865. In addition to the Boland Amendment expressly prohibiting the use of federal
funds to support the Contras, Congress had also adopted multiple legislative reforms following
the Nixon administration designed to strengthen congressional oversight of the intelligence
community, including mandating notification to Congress and congressional oversight of
covert action operations. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32,
88 Stat. 1795, 1804–05 (1974) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2422); see also Robert Chesney,
Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L
SEC. L. & POL’Y 539, 593 (2012) (describing the range of legislative reforms during this era).
161. Indeed, some of the CIA personnel involved in the Iran-Contra affair had been among
the personnel working in Cambodia the decade before. See Robert Timberg, Alleged IranContra Players No Strangers to Spy Affairs, BALT. SUN (Dec. 21, 1986),
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000606010001-9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q88T-XMQK].
162. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
163. BAKER, supra note 156, at 24.
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administration—and only then with respect to § 5(b) of the WPR (requiring
the automatic termination of the use of force after sixty days in the absence
of congressional authorization).164 Not even President Nixon (who famously
vetoed the bill in part on constitutional grounds before Congress’s override)
challenged the constitutionality of the WPR’s consultation requirement,
which he praised as “foster[ing]” the “prudent fulfillment by each branch of
its constitutional responsibilities . . . by enhancing the flow of information
from the executive branch to Congress.”165 While OLC has engaged
vigorously in detailed statutory debates about the timing of consultation and
the nature of “hostilities” triggering the reporting requirement of the WPR,166
it has never questioned the facial constitutionality of the consultation or
reporting requirements—criticisms that surely would have arisen by now had
they existed. Put differently, there has been sustained, bipartisan acceptance
over a period of decades of the constitutionality of the WPR’s reporting
requirements.
What then of the multiple executive attempts to avoid filing a formal report
pursuant to § 4 of the WPR, often based on the executive’s narrow
understanding of the kind of force that counts as “hostilities” under the
WPR.167 There is indeed a running list of incidents in which the U.S. Armed
Forces have been deployed in potentially or actually hostile situations abroad
(including, for example, a several days long bombing campaign in Iraq in
1998) in which presidents did not submit WPR reports to Congress.168 It is
far less evident that the absence of formal reports in these situations had any
bearing on the (putative) norm of not concealing military operations from
Congress. Under the WPR, the filing of the formal report starts the running
of a sixty-day clock, after which time § 5 requires any use of military force
to cease unless Congress has authorized its use.169 As noted above, it is this
cutoff clock provision that is the source of the controversy surrounding the
WPR on constitutional grounds and otherwise.170 It is, likewise, precisely
for this reason that such formal reporting failures are best understood as
avoiding the application of § 5’s cutoff provision, not § 4’s disclosure
provision. Indeed, none of the operations typically cited as among those in
which the executive should have but did not submit a formal report were
secret, much less actively hidden by the executive branch.171 All were the
subject of contemporaneous press coverage and moreover, were generally
affirmatively announced to the public at large through official statements
164. Auth. of the President Under Domestic and Int’l L. to Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26
Op. O.L.C. 143, 159–60 (2002); see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—a Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941,
1072–74 (2008).
165. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 311 PUB. PAPERS 893, 895 (Oct. 24, 1973).
166. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 153, at 49 & n.10 (describing, for example, the “tanker war”
in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 1988).
168. See COLLIER & GRIMMETT, supra note 150, at 95.
169. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
170. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
171. See COLLIER & GRIMMETT, supra note 150, at 95.
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issued by the Department of Defense.172 The executive’s behavior in these
instances fairly reflected avoidance of the application of the § 5 cutoff. But
its behavior equally reflected the rejection of executive branch concealment
of military force—that is, the executive practice supports an understanding
of Nixon’s active concealment in Cambodia as anticanonical in nature.
The same surely cannot be said of the Reagan administration’s behavior in
connection with the Iran-Contra affair. While the executive’s conduct did
not implicate the WPR, even then Attorney General Edwin Meese
acknowledged that the arms sales to Iran should have but did not comply with
parallel notification laws (also enacted following the Cambodia conflict)
applicable to the intelligence community.173 But in understanding how this
series of events bears on the anticanonical status of Nixon’s Cambodia
behavior—and the accompanying norm against concealment—it is essential
to recall how norms themselves are defined. Norms can regulate the behavior
of public officials, “guiding and constraining how these actors ‘exercise
political discretion.’”174 But there is no sense in which norms—or for that
matter, laws—cease to exist in the face of a singular violation.175 Rather, a
key part of what distinguishes a “norm” from any other form of government
behavior is that its violation is met with some form of practical (i.e., social,
political, professional, or bureaucratic) disapproval.176
In the Iran-Contra affair, the evidence of practical disapproval was
overwhelming—and especially compelling in light of Reagan’s strong
popularity otherwise.177 The scandal produced three separate, sweeping
investigations: a commission created by the president himself to review what
172. For an example of contemporaneous press coverage of one such incident, see, for
example, George C. Wilson, Secretly Acquired MiGs Aided Navy Pilots in Libya Combat,
WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 1989), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/
01/13/secretly-acquired-migs-aided-navy-pilots-in-libya-combat/f6850bce-097d-4264-bfc403729e30e118 [https://perma.cc/JTA7-7UMC]. For an example of an official Department of
Defense statement about one of these instances (reported in the press), see, for example, Philip
Shenon, U.S. Reports Mixed Results on 89 Targets in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 1998),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/121998iraq-rdp.html
[https://perma.cc/4ACP-STUX].
173. Letter from Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen., to Sen. John Tower, President’s Special
Rev. Bd. (Feb. 18, 1997), reprinted in REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD
app. H at H-1 to H-2 (1987).
174. Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1433–34 (quoting Whittington, supra note 48, at
1860).
175. In H. L. A. Hart’s classic account, because all laws by their nature carry certain
defects—most evidently, uncertainty in meaning and “the fact of violation”—mature legal
systems also have secondary rules: power-conferring rules by which primary rules could be
authoritatively identified, applied, and changed. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81, 92–
94 (1961) (describing the need for rules of recognition, change, and adjudication that
determine what the primary legal rules are and when they have been violated).
176. See, e.g., Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1439 (citing Vermeule, supra note 48, at
1182); Renan, supra note 9, at 2198.
177. Frank Newport et al., Ronald Reagan from the People’s Perspective: A Gallup Poll
Review, GALLUP (June 7, 2004), https://news.gallup.com/poll/11887/ronald-reagan-frompeoples-perspective-gallup-poll-review.aspx
[https://perma.cc/35RC-726W]
(“Reagan
continued to soar in 1985, routinely receiving ratings in the 60% range. In May 1986, Reagan
received a 68% job approval rating, tied for the highest of his administration.”).
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happened,178 an independent counsel investigation to assess criminal
liability,179 and an investigation by select committees of Congress convened
to evaluate the course of events and the need for legislative reform.180 The
independent counsel investigation yielded fourteen criminal indictments, all
but three resulting in convictions and all involving the underlying conduct
and subsequent efforts to conceal it.181 The scandal likewise sparked
renewed legislative efforts to clarify and tighten covert action requirements,
producing a multiyear set of debates capped by significant revisions to the
law governing covert action.182 As for the public’s reaction, Gallup tracked
a staggering 16 percent drop in President Reagan’s job approval rating in the
weeks following his attorney general’s first public acknowledgment that the
administration had been secretly using profits from the Iranian arms sales to
help fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.183 Gallup described the shift at the
time as “the sharpest one-month drop ever recorded by a public opinion poll
in measuring approval of Presidential job performance.”184 Indeed, the
monthly poll following the attorney general’s announcement found 79
percent of Americans disapproving of the Reagan administration’s conduct
in the matter.185 In the end, the president turned to television, addressing the
nation directly from the Oval Office about the scandal.186 Far from seeking
to defend his actions (with reference to past presidential behavior or
otherwise), President Reagan embraced the critical findings of the Tower
Commission report, accepted its recommendations, and regretfully took full
responsibility for the administration’s conduct.187
In addition to reinforcing the previous conclusion about the effect of
judicial silence not foreclosing the prospect of anticanonical status, this
example suggests several amendments to the criteria established so far for
178. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, supra note 173, at 1–2.
179. See WALSH, supra note 121, at xiii.
180. See REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR, S. REP. NO. 100-216, H. R. REP. NO. 100-433 (1987), at xv–xvi.
181. WALSH, supra note 121, at xiv.
182. See Pub. L. No. 102-88, § 503(e), 105 Stat. 429, 443–44 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 3093(e)). For an extensive history of the evolution of the statute following the scandal, see
Chesney, supra note 160, at 592–601.
183. Surrounding the attorney general’s announcement on November 25, 1986, Gallup
recorded a drop in the president’s job approval rating from 63 percent in late October 1986 to
47 percent in early December. Lydia Saad, Gallup Vault: Reaction to Iran-Contra 30 Years
Ago, GALLUP (Nov. 25, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/vault/198164/gallup-vault-reactioniran-contra-years-ago.aspx [https://perma.cc/KJ43-JL48].
184. Richard J. Meislin, President Invites Inquiry Counsel; Poll Rating Dives; 46%
Approve Reagan’s Work, down 21 Points, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 1986),
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/02/world/president-invites-inquiry-counsel-poll-ratingdives-46-approve-reagan-s-work.html [https://perma.cc/8KQ4-9QX9].
185. JANE MAYER & DOYLE MCMANUS, LANDSLIDE: THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT,
1984–1988, at 316 (1988).
186. The Reagan White House; Transcript of Reagan’s Speech: ‘I Take Full Responsibility
for My Actions,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/
03/05/us/reagan-white-house-transcript-reagan-s-speech-take-full-responsibilty-for-my.html
[https://perma.cc/K8KT-BYG5].
187. Id.
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evaluating anticanonical status. Most notably, anticanonical status may exist
even if the executive has repeated the anticanonical practice. While one
would expect anticanonical norms to have some constraining effect on
subsequent executive branch practice, one would no more suspect legal
norms of securing perfect compliance than one would expect as much from
norm-based laws (like murder).188 As the definition of norms embraced
above suggests,189 what matters in both instances is whether any apparent
variance from the norm produces or can be anticipated to produce negative
practical consequences of some kind for future presidents. Here, the
executive was at pains to explain even technical variances in terms of the
(nonconcealment) norm (as in its detailed explanations for not filing reports
under article 4 of the WPR) and suffered significant negative consequences
when it was violated without explanation (as in efforts to mask Iran-Contra
from Congress). Indeed, repetition coupled with a negative reaction—most
especially against an otherwise popular president—may, in this sense, prove
to be stronger evidence of anticanonical status than nonrepetition from which
disfavor can only be inferred.
Which brings us back to the Korematsu internment practice introduced at
the outset, a seemingly anticanonical incident that President Trump invoked
favorably during his campaign.190 Not only did candidate Trump campaign
and win the election on a platform advocating the mass exclusion of a suspect
class of individuals from the United States on ostensible national security
grounds,191 he issued a series of orders as president aimed at carrying such
an exclusion into effect—the third version of which was ultimately upheld
by the Supreme Court.192 True, the Trump travel ban orders were aimed not
at U.S. citizens but at noncitizens, discriminated not on the basis of race but
of religion, and significantly involved not detention but denial of
admission.193 But it was President Trump himself who thought the parallel
sufficient. Have these actions now compromised the anticanonical status of
the presidential practice—or, put differently, weakened the especially
compelling character of the norm? While the fate of travel ban policies, and
the Trump presidency more broadly, is yet to unfold, there are reasons to look
at the systemic response to the initial travel ban order as importantly norm
reinforcing. In the face of massive public protests and aggressive litigation,
the travel ban in its original form was struck down quickly and repeatedly by
the lower courts, and the executive moved to revise it in important ways
(among others, by clarifying that those with long-standing residence in the

188. See HART, supra note 175, at 93 (noting the “fact of violation” among all legal
systems).
189. See supra Parts I.A.2–3.
190. See supra Part I.B.
191. See Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims
Entering the United States,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-ofmuslims-entering-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/W34B-R52E].
192. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403–04, 2423 (2018).
193. See id. at 2423 (distinguishing from Korematsu).
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United States would not be affected) before producing a version of the order
finally upheld by the Court.194 Indeed, the Court took the occasion of
affirming a revised version of the policy to conclude that the Korematsu
decision that candidate Trump had invoked was itself no longer good law.
The systemic response to these actions is still unfolding. But it would be a
mistake to ignore those indications that already exist that President Trump’s
use has had, at least in part, a norm-reinforcing effect.
C. Conducting Sustained Military Ground Operations Without
Congressional Authorization
The discussion of the Cambodia example began by hypothesizing that
ongoing contestation surrounding the president’s authority to use force
absent congressional authorization made presidential use-of-force practices
an unlikely area in which to find even plausible candidates for anticanonical
status. Much constitutional law on the topic remains unsettled. Indeed, “few
areas of American constitutional law engender more fierce debate.”195 At
the same time, the Korean War was and remains an unprecedented, and
unrepeated, assertion of presidential authority to go to war without
congressional authorization. Nearly 1.8 million American troops were
deployed to the Korean theater between 1950 and1953 in a conflict involving
air, sea, and ground combat that left more than 36,000 American soldiers
dead and more than one hundred thousand wounded.196 In the seventy years
since, in every U.S. war of comparable scope (in the introduction of ground
troops, duration, or loss of life), presidents have sought and received some
form of express congressional authorization.197 Since the Korean War, OLC
has repeatedly taken the position that the president’s constitutional authority
to use force without prior authorization excludes operations “sufficiently
extensive in ‘nature, scope, and duration’” that they rise to the level of “war
in a constitutional sense.”198 Notwithstanding conventional wisdom, which
194. See id. at 2403–04.
195. See BAKER, supra note 156, at 3.
196. NESE F. DEBRUYNE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32492, AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 8 (2019).
197. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107–243, 116 Stat. 1498 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against September 11 Terrorists, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964)
(repealed 1971).
198. Auth. to Use Mil. Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8–10, 13 (2011) (quoting
Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 179 (1994)) (“This standard
generally will be satisfied only by prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically
involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.
Again, Congress’s own key enactment on the subject reflects this understanding. By allowing
United States involvement in hostilities to continue for 60 or 90 days, Congress signaled in
the WPR that it considers congressional authorization most critical for ‘major, prolonged
conflicts such as the wars in Vietnam and Korea,’ not more limited engagements.” (quoting
Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 176 (1994))); see also, e.g.,
Apr. 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chem.-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2018);
Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173 (1994).
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treats President Truman’s decision to commit combat forces to Korea as but
one example in a lengthy catalog of practice in which executives have used
force without prior authorization,199 could it be that Truman’s example—an
example of no small significance in ongoing debates about executive
power—now has anticanonical status? The question turns out to be
remarkably close.
The judicial record here is perhaps more instructive, and more
condemnatory, than elsewhere. There is no reported case opining directly on
the constitutionality of President Truman’s commitment of troops in Korea.
Indeed, unlike in Vietnam and later conflicts, there appears to be no reported
case even involving a constitutional challenge to the president’s use of force
in Korea on this point. At the same time, the Supreme Court came closer
here to signaling its disapproval of the president’s action than it did on the
matter of the Cambodian nondisclosure. In Steel Seizure, the government
had offered as evidence of the capaciousness of the president’s war powers
the practical example of the massive deployment of troops to Korea, “sent to
the field by an exercise of the President’s constitutional powers” alone.200
Justice Robert Jackson did not “find it necessary or appropriate to consider
the legal status of the Korean enterprise to discountenance,”201 as he did, the
government’s argument that the president’s commander-in-chief authority
included the power to seize and operate steel mills domestically.202 But
Justice Jackson’s decision to focus on the president’s lack of domestic
powers came only after his cautionary assessment: “Nothing in our
Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only to
Congress.”203 Indeed, the Steel Seizure majority’s rejection of the notion that
Truman’s practice in Korea might now inform the meaning of Article II is
made particularly plain in context; the sole instance in which a reported
judicial opinion cites President Truman’s practice in support of presidential
power is in the Steel Seizure dissent.204
President Truman’s action to repel North Korean forces following their
surprise invasion of the South was met at first with overwhelming popular
support both in Congress and in the general public.205 But opinion on the
199. See generally ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
200. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 643.
202. Id. at 642–43.
203. Id. at 642.
204. See id. at 700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (“President Truman acted to repel aggression
by employing our armed forces in Korea . . . Congress responded by providing for increased
manpower and weapons for our own armed forces, by increasing military aid under the Mutual
Security Program and by enacting economic stabilization measures, as previously described.
This is but a cursory summary of executive leadership. But it amply demonstrates that
Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and protect the country whether or
not Congress happened to provide in advance for the particular method of execution.”).
205. Notably, among President Truman’s first moves in response to the surprise invasion—
and news of its rapidly crushing effects—was to call a sizeable group of congressional leaders
to the White House to inform them of the situation and of Truman’s inclination to act. After
receiving the president’s assurance that they would be kept “currently informed of
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action quickly soured among both over time as the war effort struggled.206
While it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to untangle fully the varied reasons
why the Korean War became so unpopular, at least part of the opposition in
Congress plainly centered on doubts about the president’s constitutional
authority. Prominent Republican Senator Robert Taft was among the first to
call into question the adequacy of the president’s authority to proceed in
Korea, a concern that took root as it became clear combat would continue
beyond America’s emergency action to repel the invasion from the North.207
As even OLC would later recognize, President Truman’s action in Korea—
with the authorization of the United Nations (UN) Security Council but
“without prior approval of, or subsequent ratification by, Congress”—
centrally informed the so-called “Great Debate” of 1951 over whether the
United States should commit troops to Europe pursuant to the newly formed
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).208 In the end, the Senate voted
to support the NATO deployment but only after voting overwhelmingly for
an amendment emphasizing that no further ground forces would be sent to
Europe in implementation of the treaty without “further congressional
approval.”209 Over time, Senator Taft’s doubts about the adequacy of the
president’s legal authority gained traction.210 The 1952 Republican Party
developments,” congressional leaders promised the president their undivided support. DEAN
ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 409 (1969); see also DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN
780–81 (1992).
206. For public opinion polling, see Steve Crabtree, The Gallup Brain: Americans and the
Korean War, GALLUP (Feb. 4, 2003), https://news.gallup.com/poll/7741/gallup-brainamericans-korean-war.aspx [https://perma.cc/3UF2-NWDX].
207. See, e.g., ACHESON, supra note 205, at 410, 414–15. While Acheson, President
Truman’s secretary of state, chalked Senator Robert Taft’s opposition up to partisan politics,
President Truman’s own secretary of commerce (and roving ambassador), Averell Harriman,
equally pressed President Truman to seek a war resolution from Congress. MCCULLOUGH,
supra note 205, at 789.
208. Presidential Auth. to Permit Incursion into Communist Sanctuaries in the CambodiaViet. Border Area, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 313, 316–17 (1970) (“The authority of the President to
commit troops in limited conflict is not, of course, unquestioned. There are Presidents who
have doubted such authority and Congress has challenged it more than once. President
Truman’s commitment of troops in Korea in response to a United Nations (‘U.N.’) resolution
without prior approval of, or subsequent ratification by, Congress led to the Great Debate of
1951.” (citations omitted)).
209. 13 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 225–28 (Raymond Dennett et al.
eds., 1951) (reprinting S. Res. 99, 82d Cong. (1951)); see also, e.g., id. at 15 (“[T]he President
incorrectly assumed that the United Nations was an operating organization, with power to call
on us for troops which we could supply. As a matter of fact, he had no authority whatever to
commit American troops to Korea without . . . congressional approval.” (quoting statement of
Senator Robert Taft)).
210. 93 CONG. REC. 21,233 (1973) (statement of Rep. Thomas Morgan) (“At that time it
was believed by many in the executive branch, and in the Congress, that by becoming a
member of the United Nations, the United States was obligated by U.N. commitments,
including commitments to international police actions, and that it would be within the power
of the President alone to see that those commitments were carried out. Although the Congress
did not formally accept this position, neither did it as a whole contest the right of the Executive
to respond to the call of the United Nations Security Council. Some members, however, were
outspoken in their view that power of Congress had been usurped. Among them was the great
Republican Senator from Ohio, Senator Robert Taft.”).
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platform singled out as among the failures of the Truman administration the
decision to “plung[e] us into war in Korea without the consent of our citizens
through their authorized representatives in the Congress.”211 By 1973,
Korea, along with Vietnam, had become a poster child in Congress for
advocates of the WPR. As one member put it:
As the result of our country’s experience in Korea and Vietnam, one lesson
should be clear by now to everyone: Congress must play its rightful role in
warmaking—not only to satisfy the demands of the Constitution—but also
for the practical reason of creating the national unity and purpose which are
necessary for the success of our national effort.212

The growth of misgivings over time about President Truman’s lack of
congressional authorization might in part explain the consistency of
executive branch practice since. While presidents have used force in various
ways without congressional authorization many times since Korea, every
conflict involving a significant commitment of U.S. ground troops or U.S.
casualties since has had some form of express congressional authorization.213
And while presidents since have spoken with varying degrees of praise of the
policy wisdom of “Truman’s War” in Korea, I have not unearthed any
instance in which a president since has publicly invoked President Truman’s
example in defense of his own decision to use force without congressional
authorization elsewhere.214 Indeed, even when faced with a legal situation
identical to the one that faced Truman—having won UN Security Council
authorization but not the approval of Congress for the use of force in Libya
in 2011—neither President Obama nor the Obama administration’s OLC
invoked the Korea example in support of the proposition that the president
has the power to act without congressional authorization, a proposition OLC
limited to the use of force, as anticipated in Libya, less than “war in a
constitutional sense.”215
211. Republican Party Platform of 1952, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, UC SANTA
BARBARA (July 7, 1952), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-partyplatform-1952 [https://perma.cc/MS5N-NRHQ].
212. 93 CONG. REC. 21,233 (statement of Rep. Thomas Morgan).
213. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against September 11 Terrorists, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub.
L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (repealed 1971).
214. This finding is based on a search of a database of presidential speeches and documents
collected by the University of California Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project. See
The American Presidency Project, UC SANTA BARBARA, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents [https://perma.cc/8EKM-KCAF] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). I searched the
speeches for any mention of the word “Korea” and reviewed each for an indication that the
example was used to support the assertion of executive authority to use force without
congressional authorization.
215. Auth. to Use Mil. Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8–10, 13 (2011) (explaining that
“war” within the meaning of the Constitution generally only describes “prolonged and
substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to
significant risk over a substantial period” and arguing that the sixty or ninety-day limit
imposed by the WPR demonstrated Congress’s view that congressional authorization was
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Yet it is, perhaps ironically and certainly instructively, OLC’s writings that
provide the most important evidence against the conclusion that the Korean
War is now anticanonical practice. In one sense, that evidence is fairly thin.
While OLC war powers opinions generally rely heavily on past examples of
presidential practice in support of OLC’s understanding of the president’s
constitutional power, reliance on the Korea example has been remarkably
limited. Of more than a dozen publicly available OLC memoranda
addressing presidential war authority since President Truman, the vast
majority of mentions of Korea are for the purpose of supporting limited and
largely uncontroversial propositions. OLC has occasionally noted the Korea
action, for instance, in support of the proposition that protecting the
credibility of the UN has been an important national interest of the United
States.216 A 1980 OLC opinion was the first to suggest that Korea might
serve as precedent “for the commitment of United States armed forces,
without prior congressional approval or declaration of war, to aid an ally in
repelling an armed invasion,” although that suggestion is immediately
followed by the caveat that “clearly such a response cannot be sustained over
time without the acquiescence, indeed the approval, of Congress.”217
Although OLC’s references to the Korea example may be limited, two
such references do require closer examination. First, in a 2002 George W.
Bush administration OLC opinion signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay
Bybee, OLC for the first time cited Korea in unmodified support of the
practical proposition that “[p]residents have long undertaken military actions
pursuant to their constitutional authority as Chief Executive and Commander
in Chief . . . [in] numerous unilateral exercises of military force.”218 On its
face, this single-sentence reference to the conflict in support of an otherwise
unremarkable, general proposition seems something less than a major shift
in the conflict’s precedential value in the executive branch. Indeed, the 2002
memorandum was submitted after President George W. Bush had already
secured congressional authorization for the 2003 Iraq War, making the
memorandum’s position on the sweeping scope of presidential authority in
the absence of congressional authorization (up to and including force

most critical for “‘major, prolonged conflicts such as the wars in Vietnam and Korea,’ not
more limited engagements” (quoting Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 173, 176 (1994))). The OLC’s Libya memorandum mentions Korea in support of the
notion that the U.S. government has long recognized that “[t]he continued existence of the
United Nations as an effective international organization is a paramount United States
interest,” but it otherwise defends the constitutionality of the president’s actions in Libya on
the grounds that it involves a use of air power without the introduction of ground troops. Id.
at 12 (quoting Auth. to Use U.S. Mil. Force in Som., 16 Op. Att’y Gen. 6, 11 (1992)).
216. See, e.g., id. at 8–9.
217. Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Without Statutory Authorization, 4a Op.
O.L.C. 185, 187–88 (1980).
218. Auth. of the President Under Domestic and Int’l L. to Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26
Op. O.L.C. 143, 151–52 (2002). On the Korea example, the memorandum states in full: “For
example, the deployment of U.S. troops in the Korean War by President Truman was
undertaken without congressional authorization.” Id. at 152.
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necessary to secure “regime change”) the equivalent of legal dicta.219
Neither was the George W. Bush administration keen to publicly press its
reading of presidential power in this realm; despite congressional efforts to
obtain the 2002 memorandum,220 it was not revealed until 2009, upon release
by the Obama administration’s Justice Department.221 The Obama Justice
Department did not include the 2002 memorandum among the nearly dozen
OLC memoranda it withdrew during that period as “not consistent with the
current views of OLC,”222 a highly unusual move for any OLC. However,
its subsequent 2011 OLC opinion on the president’s power to use force in
Libya returns to the previously articulated limitation on the president’s
power: the force that the president undertakes alone must be something less
than force of the duration and scope that would amount to “war in the
constitutional sense.”223 Likewise, while the Trump administration’s OLC
memorandum on the use of force in Syria again mentions Korea in a list of
historical instances in which presidents have used force without
congressional authorization, it too plainly and repeatedly embraces the postKorea standard: unilateral uses of force by the president going forward must
amount to something less than “war in the constitutional sense.”224 These
memoranda mention Korea but do not seem to rely on it in its relevant sense;
and the presidential practice that follows each is inconsistent with the practice
Truman pursued.
A second type of OLC reference is more problematic. OLC has twice
(under President Nixon in 1970 and under President Clinton in 2000)
referenced Korea in support of some version of the proposition that
congressional appropriations following a president’s decision to deploy
troops into (otherwise unauthorized) hostilities might be taken as evidence of
congressional acquiescence to (or even authorization of) the use of force in
some circumstances.225 This use is potentially problematic in two respects:

219. See id. at 144 (“We conclude that the President possesses constitutional authority for
ordering the use of force against Iraq to protect our national interests.”).
220. Press Release, Off. of U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Postpones Return of Subpoena
for OLC Documents: Justice Department Offers to Provide OLC Documents (Nov. 17, 2008),
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-postpones-return-of-subpoena-for-olc-documentsjustice-department-offers-to-provide-olc-documents [https://perma.cc/54UL-QZGQ].
221. Deborah Pearlstein, DOJ Releases More Bush-Era Legal Opinions—UPDATED,
OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 1, 2009), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/01/09/us-department-of-justicereleases-new-bush-era-opinions [https://perma.cc/JA3B-5UVD].
222. Memorandum for the Files from Stephen G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Jan. 15, 2009).
223. Apr. 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chem.-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1
(2018).
224. Id.
225. See Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kos., 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 334–35
(2000) (“It has also been argued that Congress ratified the Korean War by enacting several
major pieces of war-related legislation during that conflict . . . .”); Presidential Auth. to Permit
Incursion into Communist Sanctuaries in the Cambodia-Viet. Border Area, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C.
313, 317 (1970) (“While various scholarly views were quoted on both sides of the issue and
the congressional debate raged from January to April, there was no legal resolution of the
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(1) it suggests that, notwithstanding the various ways in which Congress and
the public expressed their disapproval of President Truman’s action in Korea
noted above, Congress itself subsequently ratified President Truman’s
actions; and (2) it suggests that the executive branch has at least on occasion
relied on the Korea precedent to establish a positive executive branch norm
(i.e., presidents can use even Korea-level force without prior authorization so
long as Congress continues to appropriate funds for deployed troops)—a use
that would seem to take Korea out of the running for anticanonical status.
The first inference from OLC’s reliance on Korea in this respect—that
Congress itself subsequently accepted the president’s actions in Korea as
constitutional—is more easily dismissed. Both OLC memoranda, as well the
underlying scholarly sources that comprise the principal basis on which the
memoranda support their proposition of congressional authorization or
acquiescence, take pains to recognize that Congress’s post-Korea legislation
may not actually have sufficed to establish either. The sole authorities on
which the 1970 OLC memorandum relies in support of its passing assertion
of congressional acquiescence to Korea include no reference to legislation at
all but rather two popular histories—neither one of which discusses, much
less supports, the proposition that Congress acquiesced to President
Truman’s action.226 The 2000 OLC memorandum likewise mentions Korea
in a single sentence, noting that “[i]t has also been argued that Congress
ratified the Korean War by enacting several major pieces of war-related
legislation during that conflict, including a bill to increase taxes by $4.7
billion to help pay for the war.”227 The memorandum itself does not
embrace, much less make, this argument. Instead, it cites solely to work by
legal scholar John Hart Ely, who also notes the existence of the argument
President’s authority in light of the U.N. Charter or independent of it. Nevertheless it is clear
that Congress acquiesced in the President’s action.” (citations omitted)).
226. See Cambodia-Viet. Border Area, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. at 316–17 (first citing DAVID
REES, KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR (1964); and then citing MERLO J. PUSEY, THE WAY WE GO
TO WAR (1969)). Pusey, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist at The Washington Post, pulled
no punches in characterizing President Truman’s action: “The appalling fact is that the
President plunged the United States into the war without a shred of authority from the
Constitution or the laws or treaties.” MERLO J. PUSEY, THE WAY WE GO TO WAR 89 (1969).
His book offers no discussion of post-invasion legislation that could be understood as
congressional approval of President Truman’s action (indeed, devotes no ink to post-invasion
legislation at all); cites President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s subsequent election (and President
Eisenhower’s promise, backed by practice, to seek congressional authorization for any
military action) as another rejection of Truman’s conduct, id. at 97–98; and makes a vehement
case that the Steel Seizure decision should be seen as a manifest rejection of any argument that
Korea now stands as precedent for presidential war powers in this realm. Id. at 160–61. The
book by David Rees, a conservative British scholar and onetime literary editor of The
Spectator, is a lengthy political, military history of the Korean War. To the extent it engages
internal U.S. political debates, it is on the political and strategic imperatives of Korean
intervention. There is scant discussion of constitutional considerations at all, save to the extent
Rees recognizes that President Truman’s decision not to seek congressional authorization
would become a vigorous point of attack by domestic opposition (which eventually hands
President Truman a crushing defeat in 1952). DAVID REES, KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR 26,
400–01 (1964).
227. See Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kos., 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 334–35
(2000).
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without embracing it and indeed, while expressing skepticism of it.228 To
the extent anyone actually argued Congress had approved the war in Korea,
it appears traceable to a 1974 article by two political scientists who cite
several 1950 enactments, including bills: extending the draft and lifting the
ceiling on the size of the armed forces, making various economic adjustments
to prevent inflation in response to anticipated increased defense production,
granting foreign aid to various countries in Asia, and increasing taxes.229
None of the bills in any way authorized the use of military force in Korea (or
elsewhere), and as the 2000 OLC memorandum itself made clear, no such
authorization can be properly inferred unless the legislation “clearly
intend[s]” to grant “specific authorization.”230 As to whether the statutes can
be understood as acquiescence to President Truman’s decision to launch a
war without congressional authorization, that case is likewise difficult to
sustain. For one thing, all of the legislation cited to support the theory of
congressional acquiescence to the Korean War was enacted within the first
three months of the military’s deployment,231 reflecting, at most, Congress’s
initial support for what members might have expected would be a short-term
engagement.232 Particularly with the subsequent enactment of the WPR, in
express response to the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, it seems hard to
credit the notion that the legislation stands for congressional acquiescence to
waging a sustained ground war without authorization.
The second inference from OLC’s usage—that Korea supports an
affirmative executive branch norm regarding the use of force—is more
problematic. Could an executive branch legal opinion suggesting that a
president could do what Truman did in Korea—an opinion no president has
ever acted on and that the Court has implicitly rejected—really save from
anticanonical status a precedent that has been in all other ways practically
condemned? The prospect that a practical precedent could be invoked by the
courts seems rather a slim basis on which to save it from at least current
precedential ignominy; any institutional actor could, in theory, rely on any
otherwise disfavored practice at any time.233 The mere prospect that even
long disfavored practices might someday be resurrected seems hardly
sufficient to overcome their status as currently disfavored.

228. ELY, supra note 153, at 11 & nn.66–67.
229. Larry Elowitz & John Spanier, Korea and Vietnam: Limited War and the American
Political System, 18 ORBIS 510, 517 n.11 (1974–75).
230. See Continuing Hostilities in Kos., 24 Op. O.L.C. at 346; accord 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)
(providing that war authority “shall not be inferred . . . from any provision of law . . . unless
such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities”).
231. See, e.g., The Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568).
232. I say “at most” because some of the legislation, like the foreign aid bill, is equally
consistent with a congressional view that supports monetary aid to South Korea to enable it to
repel the North’s invasion itself.
233. Cf. Alex Thompson, Progressive Activists Push 2020 Dems to Pack Supreme Court,
POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2019, 9:11 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/25/
progressive-activists-pack-supreme-court-1182792 [https://perma.cc/LRT7-24CT].
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At the same time, OLC’s willingness to invoke the example suggests that
one would be relying on Korea’s anticanonical status at peril—that is, it
would be a mistake to assume that no court would ever rely on it as evidence
of constitutional meaning or that President Truman’s action is so generally
recognized as mistaken that it is has come to set a standard for what the
executive branch should not do. Many former OLC attorneys later make
their ways to the federal bench; indeed, the 1970 memorandum was authored
by former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the 2002 memorandum was
authored by now Ninth Circuit Judge Jay Bybee.234 While courts rarely
decide cases involving the president’s power to use force abroad, Korea
seems unlikely to be off the table entirely as practical evidence in, for
example, Judge Bybee’s court if they do. Moreover, OLC’s use may reflect
the pervasiveness of a normative understanding of presidential power that
exists outside the executive branch—a conventional view of an “imperial
presidency” advanced by legal scholars and political scientists in popular and
scholarly settings alike, according to which Korea is just one in a long,
undifferentiated list of incidents in which presidents “have regularly
breached constitutional principles,” using military force whether or not
Congress approves.235 Such an understanding would not be so surprising.
Presidentialist legal scholars and lawyers in particular have looked to
presidential practice in isolation from systemic response, in service not only
of normative understandings of presidentialness but also in advancing
affirmative commitments to maximizing presidential power.236
The Korea example—while likely not presently part of an executive
branch anticanon as this Article has defined it—thus adds to our
understanding of anticanonical status in several important ways. First, even
if executive branch practice does not support a norm of presidential
behavior—indeed, even if executive branch practice would support the
opposite norm of presidential behavior—it is possible that normative
expectations of presidential practice from outside the executive branch may
be enough to preserve a practice’s precedential effect. In one sense, this
might be considered a desirable effect, just the way a system of popular
constitutionalism is meant to function.237 In another sense, this effect tends
234. Auth. of the President Under Domestic and Int’l L. to Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26
Op. O.L.C. 143 (2002); Presidential Auth. to Permit Incursion into Communist Sanctuaries in
the Cambodia-Viet. Border Area, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 313 (1970).
235. For a discussion of the parameters of this conventional case, see, for example, Deborah
Pearlstein, Getting Past the Imperial Presidency, 10 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 368, 373 (2019)
(citing ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973)); see also Kevin M. Kruse
& Julian E. Zelizer, Have We Had Enough of the Imperial Presidency Yet?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
9,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/opinion/president-trump-border-wallweak.html [https://perma.cc/JJ48-3RLK].
236. Scholarly proponents of broad executive power commonly note President Lincoln’s
suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War as evidence of broad presidential power
without noting the Court’s subsequent rejection of President Lincoln’s assertion of power in
this respect or the absence of any repetition of the practice by subsequent presidents. See
generally DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 157–59 (2003) (describing this episode).
237. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
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to undermine the justification for relying on practice as a guide to
interpretation—a justification based on the notion that practice reflects
practical settlement among the political branches of government. The near
seventy-year-old practical settlement between the political branches would
make this a relatively clear anticanonical case. But in assessing the
normative impact of presidential practice, apparent intrabranch settlement is
not all that matters. In all events, the example points those who might be
concerned about the scope of presidential war power to a clearer
understanding of the stability, or not, of what normative agreement might be
said to exist.
III. UTILITY OF A PRACTICAL ANTICANON
Whether or not one believes the particular foregoing instances warrant
inclusion in the pantheon of executive branch black sheep, these examples
serve, at least, to illustrate how one might go about determining whether a
practice has attained (or sunken to) anticanonical status. The foregoing
analysis suggests at least the following conclusions. First, even if a particular
executive practice was not formally rejected by Congress or the courts in real
time, anticanonical practice will produce a substantial public record (in
hearings, speeches, or other public actions) of disfavor by governing
institutions over time, as well as sustained rejection by the public. Second,
while it is certainly possible to identify anticanonical practices that have not
since been repeated (like President Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre),
nonrepetition of the practice as such cannot be considered dispositive.238 For
one thing, plenty of historically favored actions have never been repeated
(the Emancipation Proclamation, for example) but for reasons that have far
more to do with circumstance and opportunity than with negative perception.
More importantly, no law or legal norm, no matter how deeply engrained,
enjoys 100 percent compliance; one might expect eventual repetition of even
bad behavior as part of the “fact of violation” associated with norm-driven
behavior.239 What matters far more is the institutional response to any
repetition of anticanonical practice. Repetition, when coupled with renewed
condemnation (as in the Iran-Contra affair), should be understood as
evidence of the vitality of a practice’s anticanonical status, not its demise.
Finally, even if a practice has been rejected in some measure by all three
branches, it may still not belong in an anticanon of executive practice if there
is evidence that the practice is relied on as affirmative support for presidential
action. For while the universe of presidential practice is too vast and the
bandwidth of contemporary institutions too narrow to fairly expect each
practice to receive some up or down vote of approval, affirmative reliance on
the example undermines any assumption that it stands for a shared
understanding that can reliably be expected to guide present governance.
238. See supra Part II.B (discussing President Trump’s allusions to Korematsu in support
of a “travel ban”).
239. HART, supra note 175, at 81, 92–94 (describing how legal systems handle “the fact of
violation”).
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How, then, might these conclusions inform our understanding of
presidential precedent going forward? This part suggests the exercise of
sketching an executive branch anticanon may be useful in at least three ways:
(1) guiding the use of practice in constitutional interpretation, (2) clarifying
the scope and robustness of assumed norms, and (3) identifying institutional
pathways for guarding against undesirable norm formation. To illustrate
these functions, this part considers how the examples above might help to
shed light on analogous current debates surrounding assertions of
presidential power.
A. Constitutional Interpretation
While the Saturday Night Massacre itself was never subject to judicial
scrutiny, the example provides perhaps the most direct insight among those
discussed here into whether and how anticanonical practice should be used
to guide constitutional interpretation. For notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s decision in Morrison to uphold the independent counsel statute
against a separation of powers challenge,240 the constitutionality of that law,
including its imposition of restrictions on the president’s ability to remove an
investigative counsel, has remained the subject of intense constitutional
debate,241 particularly on the import of interbranch practice on this question.
Indeed, then Judge Brett Kavanaugh, among others, has argued that
Congress’s decision to allow the original independent counsel statute to lapse
following the Starr investigation reflected the branches’ recognition that the
burden on the presidency of such a counsel was too great to be continued.242
It is an argument that takes from institutional inaction on this singular
executive restriction a lesson of collective disapproval.
Yet the anticanonical status of the presidential practice described above—
based on a record that tracks bipartisan institutional and public response over
time—would suggest just the opposite conclusion. That is, there is not only
a shared but robust recognition among the branches and the public that

240. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (addressing 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–
599 (1994)).
241. See generally Symposium, The Independent Counsel Act: From Watergate to
Whitewater and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 2011 (1998) (featuring contributions by Michael R.
Bromwich, George D. Brown, Arthur H. Christy, Samuel Dash, Joseph E. diGenova, Katy J.
Harriger, Philip B. Heymann, Brett Kavanaugh, Norman J. Ornstein, Julie R. O’Sullivan,
Jerome J. Shestack, Donald C. Smaltz, Cass R. Sunstein, and Lawrence E. Walsh).
242. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth
Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1462 n.36 (2009) (“I believe that the
independent counsel statute was a major mistake for reasons I have articulated previously.
Congress itself came to that conclusion in 1999 when it declined to reauthorize the statute.”
(citations omitted)); Id. (“The [independent counsel] law is dying because there appears to be
a consensus that it created more problems than it solved.” (quoting 145 CONG. REC. S7766
(daily ed. June 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter))). Judge Kenneth Starr himself
has made this same point. See The Future of the Independent Counsel Act: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs., 106th Cong. 425–34 (1999) (statement of Kenneth W.
Starr, Independent Counsel).
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presidents should not be able to fire counsel investigating them.243 Congress
may have abandoned the particular investigative approach set forth in the
independent counsel statute, but there is nothing that suggests it did so
because it believes presidents should be able to fire their investigators244 and
significant evidence of mutual agreement among the branches to the opposite
effect.245
The lessons here, then, are twofold. First, sensible reliance on practice as
evidence of constitutional meaning requires accounting for the range of
constituencies that help determine whether and how presidential “precedent”
is made and for the reality that those constituencies’ expressions of interest
may be most reliably assessed by observing the exchange of institutional
responses over time. Second, and correspondingly, identifying a practice as
anticanonical in the sense discussed here does not mean the courts should
henceforth ignore its effect on constitutional meaning. Quite to the contrary,
in evaluating the constitutionality of future potential mechanisms designed
to limit a president’s ability to forestall investigations into his own conduct,
the anticanonical status of the Saturday Night Massacre should be powerful
evidence of a presidential behavior that has no practical or normative
support—and no precedential effect. Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre was
and has remained understood as unacceptable presidential behavior.
B. Norm Clarification
How confident can scholars and policymakers be in identifying which
norms of constitutional governance go without saying and which may need
codification or other formal reinforcement? While President Trump’s strike
against Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani246 and his troubling threats
of “fire and fury . . . the likes of which the world has never seen” in response
to North Korean nuclear posturing have been among many events prompting
renewed interest in the adequacy of constitutional constraints on presidential
war power,247 the conclusion above that Korea may not be anticanonical in
nature suggests that scholarly confidence about the adequacy of constraints
may be misplaced. At the height of recent crises, several scholars argued that
the relevant constitutional law of presidential power is clear, and the answer
to whether the president could start a war with Korea or Iran without

243. Among the findings noted above, presidential practice itself since Nixon has reflected
a strong norm against firing investigative counsel, and the attempt to do so has been met with
significant forms of sanction.
244. See 145 CONG. REC. S7766–90 (daily ed. June 29, 1999).
245. See supra note 242.
246. Michael Crowley et al., U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of
Iranian Forces, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/
middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html [https://perma.cc/5RRP-UR94].
247. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Choe Sang-Hun, Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against
North Korea If It Endangers U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html [https://
perma.cc/7GFN-N9TT].
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OLC memoranda have
Congress’s authorization was negative.248
consistently excepted “‘war’ in the constitutional sense” from the suite of
unilateral presidential authorities, and given the strategic reality in Korea,
any U.S. attack there could only be understood as carrying a significant risk
of being a “war” in the constitutional sense.249 Indeed, bipartisan majorities
of both the Democratic-controlled House and Republican-controlled Senate
passed legislation reiterating the necessity for the president to win
congressional authorization before pursuing further hostilities with Iran.250
Yet while there is indeed significant basis for reading many OLC opinions
to recognize that standard—a standard that would be consistent with the
anticanonical nature of President Truman’s action in Korea—the analysis
above suggests the example falls short of that status. Indeed, the precedential
import of the Korea example is subject to contestation in a way that may be
particularly likely to influence present practice. Both because legal and
policy officials may come into the executive branch with strong views and
affirmative agendas about the scope of presidential power and because
popular and even scholarly understandings about the import of Korea in the
history of presidential practice does not align with what executive branch
practice has actually been, any legal norm against presidents starting fullblown wars cannot be understood to “go without saying.” Especially where
the constitutional law of executive power is obscure or unsettled, decision
makers’ instincts about what may be done may play an outsized role in
establishing the scope of reasonable policy debate. With those instincts
shaped at least in the first instance by conventional accounts, it is entirely
possible that knowing “presidents have done this” makes more likely the
assumption that “presidents can do this” will be sustained.
In addition to teaching that those worried about executive war power
would be wise to add the “no war in the constitutional sense without
Congress” understanding to the list of norms needing formal reinforcement,
the Korea example also illustrates how efforts to identify anticanonical
practice can help correct misimpressions about the historical record. There
is little doubt that the presence or absence of presidential precedent can help
establish that some conduct is out of bounds.251 The practical proposition
that “no President has ever called the press the enemy of the people,”252 for
248. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, No, the President Cannot Strike North Korea Without
Congressional Approval, JUST SEC. (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/44056/nopresident-strike-north-korea-congressional-approval [https://perma.cc/67B7-HXFZ].
249. See, e.g., id.
250. Catie Edmondson, House Sends Trump Bill to Restrict War Powers on Iran, Setting
Up Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/us/politics/
trump-iran-war-powers-congress.html [https://perma.cc/S4HL-VNFQ].
251. Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1433–34 (defining norms as a body of common
understandings, lacking formal status as law, that nonetheless have the effect of “regulat[ing]
the public behavior of actors who wield high-level governmental authority, thereby guiding
and constraining how these actors ‘exercise political discretion’” (quoting Whittington, supra
note 48, at 1860)).
252. See Emily Stewart, Trump Calls Media the “True Enemy of the People” the Same
Day a Bomb Is Sent to CNN, VOX (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
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instance, can be used to help support the conclusion there are norms that
presidents should not call the press the “enemy of the people.” Practicebased norms can likewise help establish that some conduct is acceptable. The
practical proposition that “presidents regularly use force without consulting
Congress” can help support the conclusion that presidents can and perhaps
should use force without consulting Congress. But it is easy to imagine
circumstances in which the public’s and even public officials’ perceptions
about historical practice are less than wholly accurate.253 Even among the
most well-informed public officials, organization theory provides reason to
worry that other incentives may skew perceptions about and invocations of
historical practice.254 Whatever the source of error, mischaracterizations of
underlying practice can lead to the embrace of actions that are not aligned
either with actual practice or, given norms’ self-sustaining nature, present
day preferences. Like all exercises in historical analysis, investigations into
anticanonical status can help drive decision makers to embrace courses of
action more reflective of long-standing, shared beliefs.
C. Norm Correction
Finally, charting past routes from presidential practice to anticanonical
status may offer something of a road map for how institutions can effectively
forestall emergent presidential precedent from crystallizing. Consider in this
context the Trump administration’s sweeping—regularly called
unprecedented—refusals to disclose information to Congress, whether in
connection with impeachment proceedings or other investigations,255 in
reporting the status of sanctions measures or the expenditure of
appropriations,256 or in favoring partisan notification only for activities like
the attack against ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or operations in
Syria.257 Opponents of these practices have pursued a range of real-time
politics/2018/10/29/18037894/donald-trump-twitter-media-enemy-pittsburgh
[https://
perma.cc/TJ28-NFWH].
253. As a recent national survey of Americans released by the Woodrow Wilson National
Fellowship Foundation noted, more than half of respondents did not know which countries the
United States fought in World War II and only 24 percent of respondents could identify why
American colonists fought the British. See Patrick Riccards, National Survey Finds Just 1 in
3 Americans Would Pass Citizenship Test, WOODROW WILSON NAT’L FELLOWSHIP FOUND.
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://woodrow.org/news/national-survey-finds-just-1-in-3-americanswould-pass-citizenship-test/ [https://perma.cc/Z569-M9KB].
254. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 142–58 (2d ed. 1982) (contrasting the Cuban Missile Crisis
executive decision-making process with “groupthink” dynamics in which individual decision
makers conform to group norms, often compromising critical analysis); AMY B. ZEGART,
SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11, at 67–69 (2007) (reviewing
cultural pathologies undermining necessary cooperation in pre-September 11 counterterrorism
efforts).
255. See, e.g., Cipollone Letter, supra note 15.
256. See Eric Lipton et al., Behind the Ukraine Aid Freeze: 84 Days of Conflict and
Confusion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/us/politics/
trump-ukraine-military-aid.html [https://perma.cc/2YEK-TWZ3].
257. Peter Baker et al., ISIS Leader al-Baghdadi is Dead, Trump Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/us/politics/isis-leader-al-baghdadi-
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approaches to overcome them, from impeachment proceedings to litigation,
to political campaigns and elections. Concern about the creation of
presidential precedent (in one direction or another) has been at the heart of
the intense focus on the success or failure of these measures.258
Yet while Nixon’s efforts to conceal information from Congress about his
secret bombing campaign in Cambodia were successful in real time—the
campaign was unknown to Congress or the public for nearly four years after
its commencement—the practice was ultimately denied precedential effect
(and achieved anticanonical status) through a range of actors’ collective
response, including: legislation codifying disclosure requirements to the
opposite effect, renewed public and official condemnation of analogous
conduct following repetition, and bipartisan internalization of the opposite
norm by officials within the executive branch. Whatever the resolution of
disclosure conflicts involving the current president, those concerned about
correcting perceived violations of norms of cooperation and disclosure
between branches would be wise to pursue a similarly multidimensional
approach:
enacting structural legislation to clarify and reinforce
congressional prerogatives or develop novel mechanisms for prompt
resolution of interbranch disputes; designing internal executive branch
regulations that reinforce and leverage existing, quasi-independent actors
such as inspectors general to reinforce disclosure requirements; and pursuing
ways through popular, legal, educational, and policy-oriented writing to
illustrate the abnormality of each disfavored example. As the Korematsu
example illustrates, the battle for presidential precedent can take decades to
unfold. But it is most effectively fought across multiple constituencies in
American political life.
CONCLUSION
By virtue of the norms of the system in which courts operate, judicial
decisions are commonly recognized as “precedent” the moment they are
handed down. This Article has aimed to illustrate how the precedential status
of presidential behavior is “not fixed but fluctuate[s],”259 depending on the
judgment over time of the full range of constituencies prepared—or not—to
give it effect. The existence of an executive branch anticanon demonstrates
dead.html [https://perma.cc/AW3D-4M9G] (“[W]hile [President Trump] tipped off a couple
of Republican senators, Mr. Trump made a point of refusing to inform Nancy Pelosi or other
Democratic leaders in advance of the raid, as is customary, saying they could not be trusted
not to leak.”).
258. Compare 166 CONG. REC. S615 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2020) (statement of Professor Alan
Dershowitz) (“I am sorry, House managers, you . . . picked the most dangerous possible
criteria to serve as a precedent for how we supervise and oversee future Presidents.”), with
166 CONG. REC. S647 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2020) (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff) (“Counsel
says to think about the precedent we would be setting if you allow the House to impeach a
President and you permit them to call witnesses. I would submit: Think about the precedent
you would be setting if you don’t allow witnesses in a trial. That, to me, is the much more
dangerous precedent here.”).
259. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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the importance of reading presidential practice—whether for purposes of
constitutional interpretation or otherwise—not as a fixed reality of
constitutional life but as a barometer of the present status of constitutional
meaning and norms.
As noted at the outset, the questions this Article has aimed to answer are
an attempt to define, describe, and to an extent, justify mapping such an
anticanon’s existence—the better to understand whether and how an
executive branch anticanon might come into being. It remains for future
scholars to examine why the anticanonical status of some practices—like the
Saturday Night Massacre or President Nixon’s later decision to comply with
the Supreme Court’s order to disclose inculpatory tapes—has thus far
remained relatively robust, while that of others—like the recognition of
congressional entitlement to executive branch information—are more readily
subject to renewed challenge. Perhaps the difference is historical
happenstance. Perhaps there are thematic commonalities among more
durable norms, like the relative cultural pervasiveness of the terms in which
the practice is understood. Answering these questions will require
considering both a broader range and developing a deeper account of historic
examples. For present purposes, we must continue to guard against the
temptation to mistake particular constitutional follies for permanent
constitutional truth.
The end of the current presidential administration, whenever it comes, will
bring with it an opportunity for significant reassessment—for reconstructing
those aspects of our constitutional government that have proven most
vulnerable to abuse. If the anticanon teaches us anything, it is that it would
be a mistake to view the task of reconstruction as limited to questions of
executive power alone. The anticanon is populated by examples of
presidential behavior to which multiple institutions publicly objected.
Congress took disciplinary action or (more commonly) enacted contrary
legislation; subsequent administrations of both parties internalized contrary
norms; and, just as important, the anticanonical practice was represented
critically in public education, professional training, political discourse, and
popular art—in the cultural landmarks defining civic life that all American
officials encounter well before they enter public service. Judicial precedents
may be born. But presidential precedents are made.

